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SECRECY AND INNOVATION IN TORT LAW AND
REGULATION
MARY L. LYNDON*

INTRODUCTION
Secrecy about negative technological impacts is claimed as an entitlement

in a variety of situations, though the practice is coming into question.'
In the environmental arena, where firms claim exemption from disclosure
requirements, the law is developing along a fault line that runs between
familiar intellectual property and tort categories. The current resolutionsimply transplanting traditional trade secrecy practice into the regulatory
context-is inadequate.
Knowledge about technological effects, such as pollution, has two
separate personae. It may be commercially valuable if its distribution is
limited, yet it also may be the key to identifying a disease or ecological
harm if it is distributed freely in medical and research settings. The two
functions of such data-commercial and scientific-operate in very different frameworks of meaning. A claim of entitlement in one sphere has
effects in the other, but the legal language necessary to compare the two

has not been developed. This article attempts to outline a basis for
understanding the issues by examining trade secrecy in the context of
regulation of chemical pollution.2

* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author thanks Harold S.H.
Edgar, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Richard R. Nelson, Daniel D. Polsby, Peter A. Bell, and Rochelle
C. Dreyfuss for their helpful comments on working drafts of this article.
1. For example, recently jurists and practitioners have criticized the practice of sealing court
records and settlement agreements which contain information about hazards to health. See Keith
Schneider, Court Rejects U.S. Effort to Keep Exxon Valdez Settlement Agreement Secret, N.Y.
TaMEs, Mar. 9, 1991, at p. 9; Texas High Court Cuts Into Secrecy in Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 1990, at A17. On the Texas rules, see Lloyd Doggett, Keeping Court Records in the Open;
Texas Supreme Court Adopts New Rule, TIAL, July 1990, at 62. See Arthur B. Miller, Confidentiality,
Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REv. 427 (1991); Richard L.
Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 ILL. L. REV. 457; David Timmins, Note,
Protective Orders in Products Liability Litigation: Striking the Proper Balance, 48 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1503 (1991).
2. Commentaries on secrecy and access in the law include: Kim LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS
(1988); David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERsP. 61
(Winter 1991); RICIARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
EcoNoBRcs OF JUSTICE (1981); Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law
of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1-34 (1978); SISELLA BOK, SECRETS-ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT
AND REVELATION (1983). Commentaries on the trade secrecy exemption in disclosure laws include:
RUSSEL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMIu.ro-SEcrEcY, ACCESS AND DIscLosuRE
(1980); Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health & Safety
Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARv. L. REV. 837 (1980); Elinor

P. Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets,
Regulation, and Information, 72 GEo. L.J. 1231 (1984). See also Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying

Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845 (1990); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J.
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Secrecy is an ambiguous concept and covers a wide range of behaviors.3
Legal doctrine usually starts from the position that a privilege of secrecy

must be justified, 4 perhaps because information is so flexible and productive. 5 Once it is released, information may travel far and quickly.
This characteristic itself may explain our ambivalence about secrecy and

the fact that, in practice, the law's treatment of claims to information
is somewhat uneven. The legal decisionmaker who is called upon to decide
whether a secret shall be revealed is placed in a difficult position; as an
outsider one cannot fully appreciate the value of the secret or measure

the risks of releasing it. The structure of the situation lends rhetorical
power-a "Pandora's Box" effect-to claims of entitlements to secrecy.

Courts, agencies, and legislatures may respond to secrecy issues in distinct
ways, since secrets and the risks of revealing them will be presented
differently in litigation, administrative, and legislative settings. Trade

secrecy has one meaning in a common law setting and very different
implications when it is grafted onto regulation.

Our particular experience with trade secrecy about chemicals is worth
examining closely, as it raises basic issues about participation and expertise
which are important in relation to other technical options, such as
biotechnology. Proprietary claims to information impose substantial costs
on regulation and hinder such significant regulatory initiatives as waste

177 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, Information As Property: Do Ruckelshaus & Carpenter Signal a
Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law? 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 365 (1989); P.D. Finn,
Confidentiality & the "Public Interest," 58 AusTL. L.J. 497 (1984); R. Grant Hammond, Quantum
Physics, Econometric Models & Property Rights to Information, 27 REVUE DE DROrr DE McGn.L
47 (1981).
3. If information is thought of as an economic good, secrecy can be seen as an exercise of
control over information, much like an owner's control over any property. I will speak of secrecy
primarily in these terms. Bok also focuses on behavior and identifies hiding as the defining
characteristic of secrecy. BOK, supra note 2, at 5-6. Tefft treats the option of secretive behavior
as a resource: "a social resource (or adaptive strategy) used by individuals, groups and organizations
to attain certain ends in the course of social interaction." STANTON K. TEFF'T, SEcREcY, DISCLOSURE
AND SOCIAL THEORY 35 (1980) (describing different concepts of secrecy.) Scheppele discusses secrecy
itself as an object, a piece of information which is withheld or a property of that information.
See infra section III.
4. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 883-90. Wetlaufer relates the legal presumption against the
legitimacy of secrets to several general characteristics of secrecy: first, information is power; second,
people and organizations systematically seek, as a matter of self-interest, to keep secrets; third,
there is a strong association between secrecy and bad acts, as bad acts always seek out secrecy;
fourth, secrecy operates to alienate or create distance between the secret keeper and the one from
whom the secret is kept.
5. Information is productive, but measures of social welfare commonly show large discrepancies
between private and social gains from knowledge production, suggesting a role for public encouragement of information production. Some characteristics of information make it problematic as a
subject of legal rules. It is difficult to evaluate until it is possessed and it is easily transferred, so
that control is difficult. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare & the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 604 (1982). Deception and manipulation
are easy to engage in and hard to check. A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARXET SIGNALLING: INFORMATION
TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELEASED SCREENING 143 (1974). Asymmetries of information access affect
behavior and transactions. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); JOHN W. PRATir & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER,
PRNCIPALS & AGENTs-THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (1985).
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reduction. 6 Secrecy may also be an important factor in legislative attempts
to craft market-based pollution control strategies. 7 Legal entitlements to
control information about exposure to pollution also affect the development of the health sciences concerned with technological impacts and
restrict individuals' access to medical care.
The article begins in section I by describing trade secret law and its
economic underpinnings. The strongest general argument for legal protection of trade secrecy is the claim that it plays an important role in
the intellectual property system and thus functions to encourage useful
innovation. Although this claim is routinely relied upon in legal commentary,6 economic analysis suggests that it may be overdrawn. The
practical usefulness of trade secrecy and its social benefits vary in different
technological and competitive settings. The common law protecting trade
secrets reflects this variability. Far from a firm entitlement in the nature
of property, trade secrecy is a flexible device, but one which is limited
to specific uses in the context of commercial rivalry. Trade secret law
does not purport to give trade secret claimants an entitlement to withhold
exposure information. Nor does the economic rationale for trade secret
law suggest that such an entitlement would be appropriate.
Section II describes the current regulatory law on disclosure in food
and drug, environmental, and occupational health law, and explores the
costs of the current compromise between access and secrecy. The costs
of allowing broad secrecy privileges in the regulatory context range from
the loss of individual medical opportunities to unknown but perhaps
substantial effects on the future development of technology and regulation.
Section II also explores the way in which courts and agencies respond
differently to secrecy claims. Courts appear to be more comfortable with
disclosure of exposure data, perhaps because they are positioned more
favorably to assess the merits of individual secrecy claims.
Section III discusses the jurisprudence of information entitlements.
Standard justifications for property entitlements and related theoretical
treatments of privacy and of liability compel the conclusion that health
and environmental disclosure interests generally trump commercial secrecy.
Section IV explores the options available to replace or supplement the
current law. It suggests that alternative protections for valuable information can be framed. Trade secrecy is one of an array of devices for

6. Regulators face a range of difficulties in generating information and assessing the accuracy
and usefulness of data submitted by companies. Confidentiality claims complicate the process. See,
e.g., Keith Schneider, F.D.A. Defends Milk-Producing Drug in Study, N.Y. TrmEs, Aug. 24, 1990,
at A18 (with manufacturer's permission, agency released safety studies on bovine growth hormone
to respond to public criticism on adequacy of agency safety review); Gina Kolata, Patients and
Scientists Fight for Control of Medical Information, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 2, 1990, at E4 (federal
officials are under pressure to release research results for treatment before publication of scientists'
findings); Barnaby J. Feder, Beyond White Rats and Rabbits, N.Y. TiMes, Feb. 28, 1988, at El
(new study techniques reduce the number of animals needed to test products; firm rivalry hinders
sharing of data, requiring use of more animals for testing); see discussion in section II infra.
7. See infra section II.
8. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 467-77.
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securing returns on research investment, and the usefulness of each method
varies according to its context. Foreclosing trade secret claims to pollution
or health effects information would shift reliance toward other devices.
The nature of the technologies of most immediate concern for management
of environmental quality-applied chemistry and biology-provide op-

portunities for better protection of trade secrets through a specialized
registration or patent system. Rethinking the scope and format of intellectual property protection also points to some new possibilities for
environmental regulation, such as environmental patents to encourage
research on less polluting technologies.
I.

TRADE SECRET LAW

The common law of trade secrecy has a varied history and texture. 9
Courts have had difficulty gaining purchase on a core legal theory to
support claims for relief. They have drawn on contract law,' 0 tort law,"
equity principles,' 2 and property law.' 3 Section 757 of the Restatement

9. Trade secret law dates from the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1820, an English
Court of Chancery granted an injunction against the use or disclosure of a trade secret because it
was obtained by the defendant through a breach of trust and confidence. Yovatt v. Winyad, 37
Eng. Rep. 425, 426 (Ch. 1820); see also Green v. Folgham, 57 Eng. Rep. 159 (Ch. 1823). Early
cases in the United States were Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837), and Peabody v. Norfolk,
98 Mass. 452 (1868). See M.F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW 1-6 (1987).
The law has been partially codified. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") has become
law in twenty-one states; several states have enacted variations. It has modified the common law
in several respects, mostly to strengthen the trade secret claimant's hand. The most important
application of the Act is in criminal cases.
10. Morrison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851) (secret medicine). Courts have invoked contract
principles where an express licensing or confidentiality agreement has existed. The implied contract
and tort approaches are theoretically different, but require the same elements. MICHAEL EPSTEIN,
MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 32-33 (1985); see, e.g., Speedry Chem. Prod., Inc. v. Carter's
Ink, 306 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1962) (providing list of elements under tort approach); Newell v.
0. A. Newton & Son Co., 104 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Del. 1952) (providing list of elements under
contract approach).
11. Trade secret law establishes the basic rules of fair play in competition; its goal is to maintain
commercial morality-honest, good faith business dealings. Unfair trade laws, part of tort law, are
a root. RIDSDALE ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS, 2-4 (1953); POSNER, supra note 2.
Most early cases were couched in tort law concepts, that is, the relief granted was termed
punishment for breach of confidence by the trade secret misappropriator. See, e.g., Eastman Co.
v. Reichenbach, 47 N.Y. 435 (1892), aff'd, 29 N.Y.S. 1143 (1894) (court enjoined the plaintiff's
former employees, now competitors, from using trade secrets). The Eastman court found that the
former employees' act was "not legitimate competition, which it is always the policy of the law
to foster and encourage, but it is contra bonos mores, and constitutes a breach of trust which a
court of law, much less a court of equity, should not tolerate." Id. at 441.
The tort theory was incorporated into section 757 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1939). Section
757 provides that one who uses or discloses another's trade secret is liable if the disclosure or use
"constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Most states have adopted breach of confidence as the basis
for trade secret protection. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82
(1974).
12. See generally ELLIS, supra note 11. Trade secrets also have been protected under the doctrine
of unjust enrichment, rooted in concepts of "natural justice.".
13. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text and sections II, III; see also Conmar Prods.
Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener, 172 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1949) (courts speak of trade secrets
as "property"); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983)
(applying the UTSA yet focusing on "property rights").
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of Torts, which maintains that "an exact definition of a trade secret is
not possible," is the primary doctrinal resource on the topic. It declares

that trade secret information may be a formula or 4pattern or any in-

formation which furnishes a competitive advantage.'
It is secrecy itself which is the key formal characteristic,' 5 rather than
the novelty or quality of the information.' 6 Secrecy, as a term of art,
does not have the lay meaning, "revealed to none or to few."" To8
qualify for protection, the information must be "substantially secret,"'
but the courts often relax the secrecy requirement and emphasize the
competitive advantage element. Generally, a trade secret claimant need
only show that the matter has not been generally disclosed. '9 Some rulings

14. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT § 757, cmt. b]:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be
a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
15. RESTATEMENT § 757, cmt. b, supra note 14; see also Microbiological Research Corp. v.
Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981). Courts have upheld claims without evidence of the use of
competitive advantage. See Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetake, 701 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983);
Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Baldwin, 373 N.E.2d 1000 (I11.
App. Ct. 1978). Proof of secrecy,
however, is always an element. At times, there is little discussion of use and competitive advantage.
A claimant who takes steps to maintain secrecy is deemed to have established these elements; actual
use may be the placeholder for value. Syntex Opthalmics, 701 F.2d at 683; Reinforced Molding
Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Gillette Co. v. Williams,
360 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D. Conn. 1973) (need not even be of value).
UTSA does not specify, however, that the subject of the claim must be a secret; rather UTSA
provides that it must "derive independent economic value from not being generally known ...."
Independent economic value is not defined. Minnesota has construed this to carry forward the
common law requirement of a "competitive advantage." Electro-Craft Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 89899.
16. Jurisdictions differ on whether trade secrets must be significant or novel. See Bromhall v.
Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 366-68 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (must be novel); International Indus., Inc. v.
Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 914 (D. Del. 1951), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958);
Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102,
1107 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Manuf. Co., 439 So. 2d 43, 49 (Ala.
1983); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 108 A.2d 442, 445 (N.J. 1954). According to Kewanee Oil, some
novelty will be required; that is, it must not be generally known. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974).
Kitch has analyzed the value of a novelty-based rule for intellectual property, and its relationship
to obviousness, in the context of patent law. Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere, Co.: New
Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. CT. RV. 293 (1966). The two are distinct, but tend to merge
into each other. Courts have been inconsistent on this point.
See Lee v. Samburn, 94 P.2d 153 (Ca. 1952) (if the idea or information is not obvious and
has value and would require some substantial expenditure of time, work, or money to arrive at
the same result then the information is a trade secret subject to legal protection); A.O. Smith Corp.
v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934) (trade secrets which involved nothing
more than mechanical skill were not subject to legal protection, basing secrecy protection on "paying
the price in labor, money or machines expended by the discoverer").
17. WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2261 (2d ed. 1938).
18. See Financial Programs, Inc. v. Falcon Fin. Servs., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 770, 777 (D. Or.
1974); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Data
Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 110-11 (Del. Ch. 1975) (where 6000
persons had access to design drawings with legend on them prohibiting use, they were still secrets).
19. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898-900 (Minn.
1983) (must not be readily ascertainable, but if is ascertainable only at considerable expense, may
be protected as trade secret). The Restatement makes the availability, that is, the "ease or difficulty"
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support the view that as long as most firms in the industry are not aware
of the information, it can still be treated as a trade secret because it
gives an advantage over those who do not know it and therefore it is
not the "common property" of the industry.2 0 Thus, more than one
individual or firm may have separate rights in the same 'secret,' and if
each has lawfully come into knowledge of it, each may seek legal21 protection for it, unless one publishes it, as each has a right to do.
At the same time, the scope of the law's protection of any particular
item of information is fairly limited. Legitimate means of discovery include
reverse engineering, purchase by innocent third parties, and disclosure
by one not under an obligation to maintain confidentiality. 22 If the
recipient of a secret knows the contents before a disclosure is made in
confidence, that person is free to use it. 23 A plaintiff can only prevent
use or disclosure by one who obtained the secret by improper means ;24
means include obtaining the secret through illegal activities or
improper
fraud 25 and by extraordinary measures to overcome precautions intended

of obtaining information properly, only one of several factors in determining whether or not
information is a trade secret. This is consistent with the relative secrecy concept; if the reverse
engineering is lengthy and expensive, the person who does it can have a trade secret in the information.
See JAGER, supra note 9, at 5-33.
20. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898-900; ELLIS, supra note II, at 34. Issuance of a patent is
as against the whole nation; therefore, one needs to show true novelty. However, common law
rights cannot be enforced against one who is already lawfully in possession; therefore, novelty is
not needed against everyone. A plaintiff need not show that his design is novel to the entire world.
21. See, e.g., Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 660, 661 (8th Cir. 1944) (property right in trade
secret may be abandoned). This standard is interesting in light of the "common pool" phenomenon
identified by economists. It suggests that the law will support or accept the existence of a separate
community of interest in new techniques within an industry. See infra notes 75-77, 98-105, and
accompanying text.
22. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968). "Since appellees' perfume was
unpatented, appellants had a right to copy it, as appellees concede. There was a strong public
interest in their doing so, 'Iflor imitation is the life blood of competition."' Id. (quoting American
Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959)). In Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930), Judge Hand held that fashion
designs may be copied. Just because a product is capable of being reverse engineered does not
mean there is a right to disclose it. EPSTEIN, supra note 10; RESTATEMENT § 757, cmt. b, supra
note 14. Courts will protect secrets that can be reverse engineered only at considerable expense.
See Russell v. Wall Wire Prod. Co., 78 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Mich. 1956) ("readily ascertainable");
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983) ("quickly"); Wilden
Pump & Eng'r Co. v. Pressed & Welded Products Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 390 (N.D. Cal 1978)
("readily revealed"); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971) (photographs taken in overflight did not qualify as legitimate
reverse engineering).
23. Larson v. General Motors Corp., 52 PQ 450, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); De Filippis v. Chrysler
Corp., 159 F.2d 478 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 848 (1947). The recipient of the secret may
have to pay for the use of the secret. ELLIS, supra note 11, at 42. The UTSA rejects the Restatement's
absolute immunity for all good faith third parties.
24. Forro Precision, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1130 (1985); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
25. Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Mach. Corp., 240 F. Supp. 126, 137 (E.D. Wis. 1965) (theft), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 359 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1966); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist,
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1955) (defendant feigned interest in joint venture with plaintiff),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 263 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1958); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F.
Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (aerial photos are improper means of obtaining trade secret), rev'd,
749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,
431 F.2d 1012 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
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to protect the secrecy. 26 The cases thus emphasize protection against bad
behavior and limit legal actions for recovery to defendants who have
had notice of the claim.
For the most part, trade secret law does not address nonrivalry interests
and, where there is a conflict with other legal values, the confidentiality
interest often will be compromised or overridden. 27 This situation arises
most frequently with post-employment restrictive covenants, in which the
employee agrees not to compete with the employer after the termination
of their employment relationship. Courts closely scrutinize these and may
28
treat them as restraints of trade, but standards vary from state to state.
While most of the case law treats liability as resting on an affirmative
duty not to disclose, 29 property theories have recently received increased

26. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 48.
27. Litigants may discover trade secrets where necessary to pursue a cause of action. See, e.g.,
Fibron Products, Inc. v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 206 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1960). There is also tension
between the unfair competition goals of trade secrecy and antitrust laws. See Miller, supra note 1;
Marcus, supra note 1; Timmitis, supra note 1; W. C. HoLMEs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & ANTITRUST
LAW (1991).
28. See, e.g. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation Eng'r Corp. 255 F. Supp. 645
(E.D. Mich. 1966) (balancing interests); Dunn v. Frank Miller Assoc., Inc., 227 S.E.2d 243, 244
(Ga. 1976); Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 65 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1954); Arthur Murray Dance
Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ohio 1953). Courts have been troubled by limitations on
employees' mobility and on the use of their own expertise. Employers may require employees to
agree not to work for competitors and may have implied agreements to this effect, but where a
contract limiting employment with competitors would result in oppressive limitations on employees'
ability to find work, courts often will not uphold the limit. See, e.g., Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d
639 (Il. App. Ct. 1984) (overbroad restrictive covenant violated public policy as it restricted flow
of information necessary for competition among businesses and imposed undue hardship on employees). In general, a restrictive covenant must protect a legitimate interest of the employer. Water
Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., 410 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1969). A restrictive covenant should also
be reasonable as to geographic and temporal scope. National Chemsearch Corp. v. Hanker, 309
F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D.D.C. 1970); Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shervin, 175 N.E.2d 374, 37677 (Mass. 1961); Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163, 169 (Haw. 1976); State Medical Oxygen
& Supply Inc. v. American Medical Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1989). Whether the courts
may void or modify restrictive covenants depends on the jurisdiction and on the factual circumstances.
Unless there is new consideration for an added restrictive covenant, it may be voidable. Gagliardi
Bros., Inc. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v.
Gottus, 314 A.2d 279, 281 (Pa. 1974).
The Illinois Trade Secrets Act expressly overrules the Illinois line of cases limiting confidentiality
provisions in employment contracts to reasonable time and territory. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 140, para.
351 (Smith-Hurd 1992). See, e.g., Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639 (Ill. App. 1984); Cincinnati
Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170 (I1. App. 1984). These cases were unique and the Illinois
statute returns that state to the mainstream. JAGER, supra note 9. But see Kitch, infra note 36, at
683 (disapproving).
Six states have enacted statutes which render post-employment restrictive covenants void as against
public policy. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 180. See Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade
Secret Disputes: Dissolution of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1988); Stephen
J.Davidson & Robert L. Demay, Application of Trade Secret Laws to New Technology-Unwinding
the Tangled Web, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 579 (1986); Bruce Allen Kugler, note, Limiting Trade
Secret Protection, 22 VAL. U. L. Rv. 725 (1988).
29. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 976 (1985); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982);
Cotson Co. v. Wittel, No. 4-90-0552 (11.App. Ct. filed Mar. 21, 1991). A trade secret claimant
may protect his secrets from unauthorized disclosure or use by a third party (not a party to a
contract with him) only when the third party has notice that the information is considered to be
a trade secret and the information was disclosed to the third party through a breach of duty either
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attention.30 Courts may use the term 'property' when describing a trade

secret claim. At the same time, they may discuss whether or not such
interests can appropriately be considered property and often end by
defining the cause of action as one in tort or by limiting the property
right to a relational base, that is, as against any who have acquired the
property in bad faith or through a breach of trust.3 The Supreme Court's
decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto3 2 is sometimes cited as authority
for the proposition that trade secrets generally are "property," but that
below in sections II and III, stops well short of such
decision, discussed
3a
a holding.

arising by virtue of a contract or a special relationship. See Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die
Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 424-25 (E.D. Pa. 1980); A. H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 268
F. Supp. 289, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968).
30. See, e.g., ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRM ON TRADE SECRETS (1992); cf. Pamela Samuelson,
Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and CarpenterSignal A Changing Direction in Intellectual
Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 374 n.52 (1989). Waldron notes that since the protection
given by courts to property is much stronger than that given to most personal rights, there is
constant pressure to expand the scope of property. Jeremy Waldron, What Is Private Property?,
5 OxFoRD J. LEG. STUD. 313, 323; see infra section IV; see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).

The Restatement seems explicitly to reject the property approach at two points. RESTATEMENT
§ 757 cmt. a, illus. 6 (1939).
Since 1960 twenty-three states have codified the property notion in criminal statutes. Most courts,
however, require that they be embodied in tangible physical form. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 6264 and app. E (some states require tangible form, others do not).
Criminal statutes generally protect only against intentional misappropriation. A number of states
have recently enacted criminal statutes specifically designed to protect computer software. EPSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 21.
31. See, e.g., Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Products Co., 31 F.2d 293, 296 (N.D. I11. 1929),
aff'd, 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929); Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708-09 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1216 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
Trade secrets have several basic features of property. They are assignable, taxable, can form
the res of a trust and pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. Unlike most property, however, anyone
who acquires a trade secret by honest means is free to use it. Junker v. Plummer, 67 N.E.2d 667
(Mass. 1946). Trade secrets are not given the same protection as patents. Junker, 67 N.E.2d at
670; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Technical
Tape, 192 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1959), aff'd, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1962).
The property approach is sometimes used to avoid contract or tort statutes of limitations. Sachs
v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 31 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1941), rev'd, 39 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. App. 1943),
aff'd, 291 N.Y. 772 (1944).
The pitfall of property theory is that since it is not a very good fit, some have argued that if
it is not property, it is not anything courts can protect. Justice Holmes, in DuPont Powder Co.
v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917), stated that "The property may be denied, but the confidence
cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of
law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them."
Id. at 102; see also International Inds., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, (D.
Del. 1951) (holding that "relationship of confidence may arise by operation of law"), aff'd, 248
F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958).
32. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The Supreme Court held that to the extent a trade secret interest in
health and safety information is protected by state law, it is protected by the Fifth Amendment;
where a federal statute creates a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" of protection of property
interests in data, disclosure of the data constitutes a taking. See Samuelson, supra note 30.
33. See, e.g., MILGRIM, supra note 30; Miller, supra note 1, at 467-77. Samuelson suggests that
the Court's finding that trade secrets were property at state law was based on a superficial reading
of the Missouri cases. See also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (confidential content
of journal's column was "property" within the meaning of mall and wire fraud statutes).
OF TORTS
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The burden of proof in litigation is, of course, on the trade secret
claimant. The plaintiff's usual problems are exacerbated by the nature
of secrecy itself: a plaintiff must not only prove a negative-that information is not known by the industry-but also that it is valuable,
even though the plaintiff has made every effort to hide even the existence
of the information. Courts have relied primarily on evidence of the
plaintiff's efforts to keep the secret, particularly on physical symbols of
such efforts. 3 4 Litigating a claim requires evidence of what the secret is,"
including disclosure, in camera.3 6 The vindication process thus puts the
entitlement at risk, if the defendant does not in fact already have the
information. A plaintiff can safely litigate only when he is confident
that the defendant already has the information; he therefore needs to
acquire information about rivals' activities."a Because some level of uncertainty about the actual state of affairs is always present in a situation
involving secrets, choices about how to proceed will entail extra costs
and risks. One positive result of litigation may be the revelation that
what the plaintiff thought was an exclusive possession is widely practiced
in the industry, eliminating some costs of guarding the information.38
Trade secret law provides firms with certain advantages. Unlike patent
law, its administration is decentralized and flexible, which may be useful

34. Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Williamson Heater Co., 86 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1923) (machines
which were open to view were not secrets); Sandlin v. Johnson, 57 F. Supp. 374 (W.D. Mo. 1944)
(behavior inconsistent with secrecy), aff'd, 152 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1945); Dow Chemical Mfg. Co. v.
American Bromine Co., 177 N.W. 996 (Mich. 1920) (precautions were actually for danger, not
secrecy); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401 (W.D. Mich. 1908) (precautions were
for danger, not secrecy).
The plaintiff always must show that he has taken steps to maintain secrecy. EPSTEIN, supra note
10, at 15; Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Mass. 1972); Healy & Son,
Inc. v. Murphy & Son, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723 (Mass. 1970) (must constantly admonish employees,
etc.). If too many employees know it or have access to it, then it is not a trade secret. Wilson
Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury Food Prod., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 (D. Neb. 1974);
Lowndes Prod. Inc. v. Brower, 191 S.E.2d 761, 766 (S.C. 1972).
As to nonemployees, disclosure must be subject to a nondisclosure agreement. Data Gen. Corp.
v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 108 (Del. Ct. of Chancery 1975) (6,000 had
access to plaintiff's drawings, but under agreement); Plastic E. Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 303
A.2d 725, 731 (Conn. 1972) (inspection by public official does not affect secrecy status). Publication
of picture of machine in annual report evidences lack of secretive intent. Wheelagrator Corp. v.
Fogle, 317 F. Supp. 633, 638 (W.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. See John T. Lloyd Lab., Inc. v. Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists, Inc., 131 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.
1942); Coca-Cola Co. v. Joseph C. Wirthman Drug Co., 48 F.2d 743, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1931);
Herold v. Herold China & Pottery, 257 F. 911, 914 (6th Cir. 1919).
36. Defendant's secrets must also be safeguarded by the process. Grasselli Chem. Co. v. National
Aniline & Chem. Co., 282 F. 379, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (defendant must disclose its processes if
necessary to adjudicate). The possibility of fishing expeditions is recognized in Bead Chain Manufacturing Co. v. Smith, 62 A.2d 215 (N.J. 1948).
The refinement of "eyes only to attorneys" discovery orders may not be worth banking on.
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEG.
STUID. 683, 689-91 (1980) (small number of criminal prosecutions for misappropriation under recently
passed statutes may be due to risks of further disclosure).
37. Trade secret litigation is more likely to yield results for plaintiffs than is patent litigation.
Trade secret plaintiffs win half the time while patent plaintiffs win 20-3007o of the time. See
STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 21.
38. STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 23-24. Most expenditures, however, are applicable to other
information.
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with rapidly developing technologies. 9 It is perpetual, as long as secrecy
is maintained. However, trade secrets are volatile and may require costly
vigilance to protect them from disclosure, 4° including restrictions on employees and the employment relationship. 4 ' Contracting with other firms
to use trade secret information may be risky and awkward. The person
who has the idea runs a risk in disclosing it, as disclosure imperils its
value. Disclosure under a mere obligation of confidence creates risks for
those who receive information, since the obligation must be assumed
before the information is revealed. If the information is the same or
similar to information already in the receiver's possession, an agreement
may prevent full use of it. Large firms are reluctant to accept ideas from
outside volunteers and require submitters to sign contracts which severely
limit their rights.4 2 Indeed, espionage may be a preferable way of acquiring
information. In any event, secretive behavior and industrial espionage
are a substantial phenomenon related to trade secrecy. 3
Trade secret doctrine thus operates in the context of commercial rivalry
for control of technology and information about it. Legal protection for
secrets facilitates fair dealing in the context of duties based upon contracts
and confidential relationships." The law seeks to provide some support
for the integrity of transactions concerning technical information and to
encourage its use to develop and improve technologies. The common law
relies on interested rivals to administer the system. On the surface this
seems to be less costly than the patent system. Trade secret law, however,
requires private expenditures on symbols of 4 5security and, implicitly, on
espionage and the study of rivals' activities.
Academic commentary on trade secrecy as such has generally focused
on two issues: the relationship between patent law and trade secrecy in
the innovation process, and the effects of trade secret protection on

39. JAGER, supra note 9, at 1-1.
40. See Robert Hershey, Commercial Intelligence on a Shoestring, HAsv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1980, at 28; JAGER, supra note 9, at 1-2; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
41. STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 23 (describing some of the costs and overreaction which result
from the uncertainty of the situation).
42. Kitch, supra note 40, at 277-78.
43. STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 7-8. Industrial security is a thriving business including about
a half dozen multimillion-dollar companies. In a 1959 survey of Harvard Business Review, 64% of
respondents employed by large companies said that their companies maintained some form of
organized intelligence system and 18% indicated that their firms had formal departments with trained
employees assigned to gather information about their employer's rivals. See also TEFFT, supra note
3, at 56-57 (citing P.I. SMITH, INDUSTRIAL. INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE (1970)).
44. EAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW (1982). This has a clear efficiency
rational separate from encouraging innovation. Id.
,45. Kitch argues that it may not be wasteful for courts to require plaintiffs to show that they
made expenditures to keep information secret, because courts are looking for indications that there
is a reasonable probability that the information is in fact secret. He notes, however, that sometimes
the best way to keep something secret is to treat it as if it were not valuable. He also suggests
that the plaintiff must think it is valuable in order to invest in litigation. However, the litigation
may be valuable apart from the secret, which might be disclosed through litigation. Another possibility
Kitch notes is that courts look to the investment as a signal to employees that the firm considers
the information valuable. Kitch, supra note 36, at 698-99.
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secretive behavior, which is generally acknowledged to be costly from
society's point of view. The two questions are related.
The appropriate relationship of trade secret law to patent and copyright
law was the subject of debate for many years.4 Until the early 1970's,
some argued that trade secrecy violated the patent clause of the Constitution, since trade secret law grants indefinite legal protection to a
monopoly and does not demand the quid pro quo of publication. Trade
secret proponents responded that a right to maintain secrecy is inherent
in the act of originating ideas and that patent and trade secret law may
be complementary rewards for innovative research. Without the exclusivity
achieved through secrecy, a useful product which does not meet the strict
standards of the patent law may not be viable. 47 Some kind of legal
protection is required to allow limited sharing of this kind of information;
otherwise hoarding of information will result.48
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. and Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., the Supreme Court held that trade secret law complements
the patent system by encouraging innovation and disclosure, albeit by
more limited means than the patent system. 49 It is now settled that secrecy
co-exists with patent law as a legitimate option for the firm seeking to
protect an investment in information which is also patentable. 0
Edmund Kitch has suggested, as a rationale for this approach, that
trade secrecy reduces the cost of the patent system. While a patent may
protect basic concepts, trade secret law can protect less important though
valuable information related to patents. Rules that allow patent holders
secretly to retain some information assist in patent enforcement, because
imitators must contact the patentee for the knowledge."' Kitch maintains
that most trade secret licensing 2takes place within a framework of rights
established by related patents.1
The adequacy of the innovation rationale for trade secrecy protection
perhaps depends on what type of information is posited as the subject

46. See Gordon L. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432 (1967).
47. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225-26 (2nd Cir. 1971).
48. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979).
49. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. 470; Aronson, 440 U.S. at 266; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 683-93
(1986) (Kewanee is based upon national policy of protection across full spectrum of inventiveness).
50. American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 107 (7th Cir. 1984); see also
CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 7 (1st Cir. 1985); College Watercolour Group,
Inc. v. Newbauer, 360 A.2d 200 (Pa. 1976); Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining, Inc.,
492 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Ohio 1986); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206 (S.D.
Ohio 1981).
51. Kitch, supra note 40, at 288; Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 677; ROBERT M. SHERWOOD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 54-61 (1990).

52. See Kitch, supra note 40, at 278 (citing unpublished work of Steven Cheung and Christopher
D. Hall). Cheung agrees and points to the uncertainty of court treatment; indeed, trade secret
contracts are filled with hedges. Cheung suggests that the difficulty of contracting concerning trade
secrets is evidenced by data showing that the ratio of trade secret licenses to patent licenses is about
one to ten. Steven Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 EcoN. INQUIRY 40, 44-47 (1982).
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of protection. Kitch's view of trade secrecy as a support for the patent
system suggests that trade secrets are largely "know-how" (i.e., information about the use of an invention). In comparison, his suggestion
elsewhere that trade secret law provides a context for firms to measure
their human capital would justify as trade secrets any kind of knowledge.
There is little consensus on the type of information which the law ought
to cover, though most courts and legal scholars assume that broad coverage
is appropriate.
Economists, on the other hand, tend to question the value of legal
protection for trade secrets; indeed, many question the value of patents. 3
Economic research on innovation has been concerned largely with identifying the forces that determine the extent of research and development
("R&D") efforts in an industry. Economists have focused on three basic
aspects of the problem. One line of research has identified demand (i.e.,
the extent of the market for real improvements and new products), as
a major factor in R&D investment and technological change.14 Another
has emphasized the central role of supply, that is, innovation opportunities
in the evolution of particular technologies and the existence of underlying
social support for investment, including the state of the sciences, the
education system, and financial conditions for investment. 5 The third
line of work has investigated appropriability factors affecting a firm's
in research, focusing on industry
ability to secure returns on its investment
5 6
structure and market concentration.
Modern intellectual property law has been most influenced by a set
of assertions about appropriability and information, articulated in the
early 1960's.1 7 Kenneth Arrow noted that the spread and re-use of in53. Overviews are given by Sidney G. Winter in OWNING SCIENTIFIC & TEcHNICAL INFORMATION
41-60 (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds., 1989) [hereinafter Weil & Snapper] and Steven Cheung,
Property Rights and Invention, 8 RES. IN L. & ECON. 5 (1986) (with Priest commenting).
54. JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1966); see PARTHA DASGUPTA &
PAUL STONEMAN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 7-8 (1987); Morton 1. Kamien
& Nancy L. Schwartz, Market Structure, Elasticity of Demand and Incentive to Invent, 13 J. L.
& ECON. 241 (1982); NATHAN ROSENBERG, INSIDE THE BLACK Box-TECHNOLOGY & ECONOMICS 18
(1982).
55. NATHAN ROSENBERG, PERSPECTIVES IN TECHNOLOGY (1976); see DASGUPTA & STONEMAN, supra
note 54, at 8. Rosenberg suggests that a useful theory of innovation must try to identify the
"supply" factors that focus innovative search upon certain solutions and must explicitly consider
the institutional structures and dynamics which affect the process of achieving solutions. ROSENBERG,

supra, at 194-95;

see DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET DEMAND

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SOME RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES, originally published
in RESEARCH POLICY 103-53 (1979). General economic strength- flexibility in economic system,
educational quality, rate of investment-is a prerequisite to national capability in high technology
industries. Another key is a system of science and technical education that trains well and points
a good percentage of graduates toward industrial careers. RICHARD R. NELSON, HIGH TECHNOLOGY
POLICIES-A FIVE NATION COMPARISON 4-5, 66-67 (1984); see also DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN
ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 294-95 (1989).
56. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation & Market Structure,
in THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol. II 1090-91 (1989).
57. ARROW, supra note 5, at 609. Of course, recognition of the appropriability problem predates
modern economics. In 1623, the English Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies to provide
adequate incentive for inventive activity. COHEN & LEVIN, supra note 56, at 1090-91. Article 1,
Section 8 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to grant "for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries," in order to
"promote the progress of science and useful arts." U.S. CONST. art. 8, § 8.
UPON INNOVATION:
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formation are virtually costless. Information cannot be evaluated until
it is known, and cannot be bargained for until its existence is known.
The producer of knowledge has little control over its dissemination and
thus little ability to recover her investment in it. The limited appropriability
of knowledge is exacerbated by the absence of an adequate market for
insurance against the risks of research, due to its uncertainty. Thus, not
enough information is produced.5"
This explains in economic terms the basic parable underlying intellectual
property law: among rivals in the market place, one is more creative
and industrious and produces a good idea, an innovation. If imitation
is too easy, the prospects of the new idea may collapse under the weight
of its own potential success. Intellectual property law attempts to overcome
appropriability difficulties by granting a monopoly as a reward to the
first inventor. This slows the process of imitation, increases the costs of
copying, and facilitates licensing, so innovators have a chance to recoup
their investments.
This basic reward model oversimplifies the situation. Nathan Rosenberg
has pointed out that the public image of technology has been built upon
the dramatic stories of a small number of major inventions, such as the
steam engine, the cotton gin, automobiles, penicillin, radios, and computers. This "heroic theory of invention" has been shaped by popular
writers and history textbooks focusing on single sequences of events
leading up to the actions of individual inventors. To understand technical
change, however, we need to look at the network of relationships in
which specific inventions are embedded.5 9
Invention evolves out of an existing stock of knowledge which has
concrete spatial and temporal limitations and potential; this context can
be thought of as a "topography." 6 In this setting we can see that the
complement to appropriability is diffusion, the process of the spread of
new technology. Information is extremely flexible, so there are widespread
incentives to acquire and build upon it. Indeed, imitation is a common
competitive strategy and part of the innovation process. Leading innovative
industries produce useful externalities for connected industries. As advances fan out, firms which are well positioned can exploit new information before competitors do. 61 In general, from the point of view of

58. ARuow, supra note 5, at 609.
59. ROSENBERG, supra note 54, at 55-56. Individual technological advances seldom stand alone;
they almost always connect economically and intellectually to earlier advances and to other related
technologies. NELSON, supra note 55, at 6. To some extent, the limitations of language itself have
also fostered it. The patent law requires that a single name and date be attached to each invention.
ROSENBERG, supra note 54, at 55-56.
60. RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE

(1982).
61. PAUL STONEMAN,

THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY 51 (1987) thereinafter
STONEMAN (1987)]; PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 65-67
(1983) [hereinafter STONEMAN (1983)]; see NELSON, supra note 55, at 2-3. Stoneman describes the
literature on diffusion in chapters 5-10 of STONEMAN (1987) and chapters 6-8 of STONEMAN (1983).
Diffusion may gather momentum as the supply of new ideas increases, but in some circumstances
it may also lessen appropriability; if a cycle is moving very fast,, new technologies may not be
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society's interest in maximizing the productivity of information, a good

economic case can be made that the earlier that diffusion comes, the
better, because information "spillovers" may reduce wasteful duplication
of R&D effort. 6 2 Appropriability protection that is too strong may delay

access to innovations by competitors who may contribute important improvements and new technologies. 63 In the last analysis, the economic
64

impact of diffusion may be more important than that of invention.

There is general agreement among economists that secrecy as such is
costly. It encourages wasteful duplication and lack of coordination. Folster
notes that because of secrecy, the optimal sequence of research is not
possible. 65 While some duplication may be inevitable, Steven Cheung and
others argue that disclosure through patents mitigates the problems caused
by secrecy, primarily because they provide some "observability" of the
activities of researchers." Cheung argues that secrecy obstructs the spread

of new information and dissipates economic rents to a much greater
degree than does the patent system. 67 He identifies four types of losses
inherent in secrecy: the cost of industrial espionage, the costs of imitation,
the costs of potential litigation, and the costs of unnecessarily delayed
research .61 He also suggests that secrecy options generate distorted research
incentives because industrial processes that can be protected by secrecy
will be favored over products which are necessarily revealed. 69 This last
effect would compound the drag on diffusion that secrecy already creates.
A cumulative result may be that technological opportunities are bypassed

adopted, as firms wait for further improvements. Diffusion may be generally accelerating now with
the emergence of a global high technology economy. See Simon Ramo, Globalization of Industry
and Implications for the Future, in JANET H. MUROYAMA & H. GUYFORD STEVER, GLOBALIZATION
OF TECHNOLOGY-

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 21-22 (1988).

62. See STONEMAN (1987), supra note 61, at 102-03.
63. See Richard R. Nelson, Assessing Private Enterprise: An Exegesis of Tangled Doctrine, 12
BELL J. OF ECON., 93-ll t (Spring 1981); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE:
A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969).

The semiconductor industry is an

illustration of progress in a cumulative technology that might have been impossible under stronger
intellectual property protections. See Richard C. Levin, The Semiconductor Industry, in GOVERNMENT
AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS (Richard R. Nelson ed. 1982); DAVID C.
MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1989).
64. ROSENBERG, supra note 55, at 55-56.
65. STONEMAN (1987), supra note 61, at 109-10.
66. Cheung, supra note 53. Patents provide visibility and information; patent owners are put
in a position to coordinate research. Owners' incentives to invest in development and application
are increased. The costs of contracting with other firms to develop the technology are decreased.
Kitch, supra note 40, at 276-77; accord Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COL. L. REV. 839 (1990); see also Jay F. Alexander & Mark F.
Grady, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. LAW REV. 305 (1991) (discussion of common
pool and coordination issues in terms of dissipation of social benefits from R&D investment).
67. Cheung, supra note 52, at 41-44. Kitch agrees. He assumes that secrecy cannot be reduced
to an insignificant level, absent draconian measures. Kitch, supra note 40, at 275. Therefore, any
system will have secrecy, though the law might refuse to lend its assistance to the protection of
secrecy.
68. Cheung, supra note 52, at 47-49; see Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 732-36 (recognizing that
secrecy prevents the public from scrutinizing harmful effects of inventions).
69. Kitch, supra note 36, at 699.
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develop.7 0 "Secrecy and efficient
or delayed and that pockets of stagnation
'7

use of knowledge are inimical." '

An important function of intellectual property rules is to coordinate
research and discourage hoarding and duplication. It is not clear that
current legal rules accomplish this. The interplay between market incentives
to secrecy and imitation and the established legal formats for appropriability may lead to inefficient results. Economists dispute the usefulness72
of patents and the type of patent coverage which may be appropriate.
Arrow suggested that without the legal protection of patents, the level
of investment will always be too low. 73 Others have been concerned,
however, that granting monopolies encourages waste. 4 Dasgupta and
Stiglitz have argued that with a patent system, overinvestment will occur
because if a patent is valuable, research efforts will cluster around the
particular research obstacle to obtaining the patent, creating "common
pool" inefficiencies. 75 Barzel suggested an analogy to resource depletion;
patents may encourage premature research. 76 A related effect may be that

choice of projects for
patents encourage excessive correlation of the
7

research, while society needs greater diversity.
Kitch has proposed a model of patent law which enriches the simple
reward theory and works from an understanding of knowledge as situated
in a topography and of the potential for common pool inefficiencies.
He suggests that rather than giving rewards for winners in technological
races, the patent system functions like the mineral claims system for
public lands. It provides the legal setting necessary to allocate resources
to the development of a technological "prospect." '7 8 The patent does

70. See Harvey Brooks, The Typology of Surprises in Technology, Institutions, and Development,
in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BiOsPHERE (William C. Clark & R.E. Munn eds. 1982); see
infra sections II, III.
71. PARTHA DASOUPTA & PAUL A. DAVID, INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND THE ECONOMICS OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 530 (1987).
72. Cheung reviews the perspectives on the usefulness of this patent system. Cheung, supra note
53; see also George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property, 8
RES. L. & ECON. 19 (1986) (commenting on Cheung and the inconclusiveness of the literature).
73. ARROW, supra note 5; see also Cheung, supra note 53, at 10-12. Arrow did not conclude
that patents will correct the problem, but found that direct government investment in research
activity is desirable. Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research Development and
Diffusion, in RICHARD SCHMALENSEE & ROBERT K. WILLIG, HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
904 (1988) (symmetrical models suggest that appropriability is important to overall level of investment;
if they are not strong enough, there will be underinvestment in the industry; if they are too strong,
there will be overinvestment).
74. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 40, at 278-79. Nelson and Winter agree that several kinds of
costs are imposed by patents or secrecy: a) higher average production costs (a gap between best
and average practice); b) duplicative or near duplicative R&D efforts (and lower best practice per
R&D dollar); and c) possible distortion of the R&D effort, which may be greater or less than it
would be in a hypothetical second-best optimum in which other costs are accepted. NELSON &
WINTER, supra note 60, at 330-33.
75. See Partha Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, IndustrialStructure and the Nature of Innovative
Activity, 90 EcoN. J. 266-93 (1980); see also STONEMAN (1987), supra note 61, at 80-84, 96.
76. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, REV. ECON. AND STATISTICS, vol. 50,
348-55 (1968) (describing the "free access" externality); see also infra text accompanying note 245.
77. Dasgupta & Stoneman, supra note 54.
78. Kitch, supra notes 36, 40.
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reward the inventor for being first, but also takes care of what happens
next, by placing the management of the prospect in the hands of the
entity best equipped to handle it and by providing a framework for
communication with other firms interested in developing the area. 79 Patents
come early in the innovation process and allow firms to signal to each
other, reducing the amount of waste. As most patenting probably occurs
before development and since most R&D dollars are spent on development,
patents may allow much research to be done openly and with efficient
sequencing. 0
Patents thus provide an alternative to costly secretive behavior. Might
trade secret law likewise reduce secretive behavior? Richard Posner and
others have suggested that the availability of legal protection for misappropriation of secrets reduces the level of guarding behavior, since
measures to prevent theft will be less necessary where the courts are
available to provide a remedy. 81 This seems logical, but it is difficult to
measure how great the benefit is, as secrets are not available for measurement. This difficulty also affects the calculations of firms choosing
between patent law and secrecy. One of the chief reasons for choosing
secrecy over patent law is that patents are difficult to enforce, because
it is hard to monitor what others are doing with your patented information.
In some circumstances this uncertainty and the general difficulty of
controlling information will cause firms to choose secrecy over disclosure.
The availability of legal protection for trade secrets endorses this choice.
In addition, courts look to guarding behavior as an index of trade secrecy.
It seems likely then that in many circumstances, trade secret law does
encourage secretive behavior. 82 The argument that legal protection for
secrecy reduces with the costs of secrecy may be true in some situations,8 3

79. Kitch, supra note 36. Kitch builds on Barzel's point that the exploitation of technological
information is analogous to fisheries, public roads and oil and water pools, resources which are
not subject to exclusive control. Where a rule of first appropriation controls, there is an inefficiently
rapid depletion of the resource; it would be more efficient to grant or auction off a monopoly,
giving the owner a right to develop the technological opportunity. See BARZEL, supra note 76.
Information is sometimes thought of as potentially unlimited and since the patent monopoly is
a restraint on output, patents have been viewed as a necessary evil and disfavored by the courts.
See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988). Kitch
argues that the reward theory has influenced the courts to see the problem as a trade-off between
the incentive effects and the output constraints of the patent; the courts have tried to weed out
patents offering the least net gain, such as trivial inventions enjoying significant commercial advantage.
Kitch, supra note 40, at 266. Kitch argues that the property rights schools' concerns with scarcity
are reflected in the patent system's prospecting function. The novelty test of the patent law places
the prospect function where development is taking place, along the frontier of the technology,
leaving the older core free for all to use. Kitch, supra note 40, at 266, 283-84.
80. Kitch, supra note 40; FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMC
PERFORMANCE 410, 412 (2d ed. 1980) (over 750o of R&D dollars are spent on development; the
initial innovation is typically inexpensive); STONEMAN (1987), supra note 61, at 109-111.
81. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 40-41; Friedman et al., supra note 2. The costs of secretive
behavior to prevent accidental loss and reverse engineering are not affected by trade secret rules.
82. Stevenson suggests that the use of trade secrecy is increasing after Kewanee. STEVENSON,
supra note 2, at 21-22. Measurement is difficult, however, as there has been little study. See section
III(A) infra; see also infra note 87 (measurement difficulties in researching trade secret use).
83. For instance, in E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th
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but it does not seem to provide a rationale for trade secret law as a
whole.
Businesses apparently do spend large sums protecting confidential information, yet the actual usefulness of trade secret law apparently varies
considerably according to context. Empirical data on the use of trade
secrecy suggests that firms in many settings find it less helpful than other
appropriation strategies. Recent research which focuses on the overall
effectiveness of patents suggests that there are striking differences in
innovation input and output and in appropriability patterns across different technologies and industries.84 In some industries, such as chemicals
and pharmaceuticals, patents apparently function well. 5 Appropriability
also rests on a number of other factors, including gaining lead time,
exploiting learning curve advantages, complementary investing in marketing and customer service, and establishing trade names. 86 Firm organization and management characteristics also affect innovation.87 Firms
in most industries use all of these strategies to one degree or another.
A 1987 survey, conducted by Richard Levin et al., examined 650
responses on appropriability conditions in 130 different lines of business.
The results are consistent with the findings of other studies on patent
effectiveness. 8 For processes, patents were generally rated the least effective mechanism. Lead time and learning curve advantages were rated
the highest. Secrecy was considered more effective for processes than
patents, but not as effective as lead time and learning curve advantages.8 9

Cir. 1970), the court found that aerial photography of the plaintiff's plant was tortious. A contrary
ruling would have required companies to erect a big top over any activity that might reveal valuable
data.
84. Industries vary significantly in the rate of patents generated by R&D dollars invested. Cohen
& Levin, supra note 56, at 1076-77.
85. STONEMAN (1983), supra note 61, at 15-17. Other studies have also suggested that in most
industries, except in pharmaceuticals; patents are not of vital importance, and that other means of
protecting returns are available. Id.; STONEMAN (1987), supra note 61, at 115-16. "The moral of
this evidence is thus that, despite a long-standing concern over the nature and impact of the patent
system, the importance of the system, in practical terms, may not be particularly great." STONEMAN
(1987), supra note 61, at 115.
86. Richard Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns From Industrial Research and Development,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTVrrY 783 (1987). Investments in establishing trade names may be
more effective and outlive a patent. Id. at 784; Meir Statman, The Effect of Patent Expiration on
the Market Position of Drugs, in DRUGS AND HEALTH: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY OBJECTIVES
140-51 (Robert B. Helms ed. 1981).
87. One study explored in detail 43 matched pairs of successful and unsuccessful innovations.
R. Rothwell et al., SAPPHO Updated-Project SAPPHO Phase 2, 3 RESEARCH POLICY 258-91
(1924), as described in ClRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 107-30
(1982). The project found that the most important determinants of success were close attention to
user needs, effective marketing, efficient management of the development process, ability to use
outside technology and communicate with the scientific community and project management in the
hands of a senior official who could work for the project within the firm.
88. Levin et al., supra note 86, at 783-820; see WEn. & SNAPPER supra note 53, at 45-57; see
also ROCHELLE DREyFUss, GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 28, 31 (1989)
(noting difficulties getting empirical data on intellectual property, especially trade secrecy); ROBERT
M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 58-59 (1990) (reporting three
informal sources which, while less focused, suggest that trade secrecy is viewed by firms as a useful
and sometimes very significant protection, particularly with respect to know-how related to patents).
89. Levin et al., supra note 86, at 794-95.
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For products, patents were generally held to be more effective than for
processes, while secrecy was less effective2 ° The data provided some
support for the idea that secrecy may be chosen instead of patenting
where disclosures in a patent may facilitate inventing around it. 91 Although
the appropriability value of a patent may be limited, the cost of patenting
is relatively low 92 and patents do tend to raise imitation costs and time. 9
Also, patents have some uses which are not based on appropriability
concerns.9 4 Generally, participants in the survey considered lead time,
learning curves, and sales or service efforts at least as effective as patents
or secrecy, and many considered them substantially more effective. 9 While
the data suggests that patents and trade secret protection may improve
appropriability, they clearly are not the only or even the primary protections.
This research has also thrown light on the appropriate time span for
legal protection. Appropriability declines as diffusion takes place and this
will vary by industry, technology, and market demand. A five year useful
life is a common estimate for trade secrets and patents. The actual time
for duplication of a major innovation or a typical patented innovation,
however, is usually one to three years.9 A typical unpatented innovation
may be duplicated within six to twelve months.97
Interestingly, most of Levin's respondents reported that only three to
five firms were capable of duplicating a major process or product innovation and, for a typical process or product innovation, the number
was six to ten. The data indicated only a slightly smaller number of
duplicators for processes than for products. 9 Thus, for any particular
innovation, a relatively small community within an industry may be

90. Id. at 795.
91. Id.
92. ERIC VON HIPPEL,

SOURCES OF INNOVATION,

51, 56 n.14 (1988) (average patent costs about

$5000). For further information see the discussion in chapter 9 of

OFFICE OF TECmOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (1986).
93. STONEMAN (1987), supra note 61, at 114-15. Stoneman notes that in the aircraft

industry,
lengthening the life of patents would have little effect on incentives, but it would have a greater
effect on drugs. Id. Levin found that for at least two and as many as fourteen industries, however,
patents reduced imitation time; a number of these industries also reported that disclosure of
information through patents was a significant drawback. Levin et al., supra note 86, at 809.
94. For instance, industry respondents to Levin's study suggested that patents help firms measure
the performance of R&D employees; since they work in teams, it is hard to separate their contributions,
but the patent application forms provide a rigorous standardized process for doing so. Patents also
facilitate access to foreign markets in developing countries, some of which require as a condition
of entry that U.S. firms license technology to a host-country firm. Levin et al., supra note 86, at
798.
95. Id. at 795-97.
96. STONEMAN (1987), supra note 61, at 106-07. Stoneman's results suggested that, with a large
proportion of patents, imitation occurs through designing around within a short time, usually four
years. Nordhaus suggests, however, that the patent system is relatively efficient for small inventions
or inelastic demand, generating about 90% of possible increase in welfare. Nordhaus' work suggests
that welfare loss for inappropriate life is great after six to ten years. Id.
97. Levin et al., supra note 86, at 810; Edwin Mansfield, How Rapidly Does New Industrial
Technology Leak Out?, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 217-24 (1985). Nelson and Winter assume that firms
can imitate. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 60, at 335.
98. Levin et al., supra note 86, at 812.
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directly concerned. This is consistent with the common pool prediction.
As firms cluster around the same technological possibilities, it is likely
that no more than a handful of firms will work on any one line of
inquiry.
A number of studies have identified channels of information diffusion.
In Levin's survey, reverse engineering for products, independent R&D,
and licensing all rated fairly highly as means of determining a rival's
technology. Learning mechanisms relying on interpersonal communication,
such as publications, technical meetings, informal conversations, and
hiring away employees were strongly correlated. These were not correlated
with licensing. Levin suggests that there may be clusters of industries
using different types of learning approaches. For new products and
processes, the largest group of industries relied on licensing and independent R&D, but there was a second group for which interpersonal
contacts were important. 9 Where this is the case, the key to making use
of new advances is good information connections. 1°° Informal know-how
trading appears to be extensive. Firms may go so far as to train rivals'
employees.101
While conventional analysis suggests that firms should be preoccupied
with secrecy and espionage, there also are indications that much information is available through the techniques described in the literature
devoted to the subject. Kitch suggests that an undertone of the literature
on how to steal your competitor's information is that firms are actually
rather careless with information and do not value it greatly. Indeed, the
trade press is full of information about new processes; firms regularly
hire consultants, looking particularly for experienced consultants who
have worked with competitors. 0 2 Perhaps technical information is not as
vulnerable to theft or loss as it first appears.103
Some important questions about the role of trade secrets remain, but
a clearer picture emerges from these studies. The literature suggests that
the structure of each market and the characteristics of each technology
establish a unique playing field. The population to which any one trade
secret matters often consists of a more or less loosely knit group of
firms, working in the same 'vicinity' of the research topography, on
related technological projects. Usually a firm's technical advances will
shortly become at least partially visible to the other firms; parallel independent research, reverse engineering or changes which are apparent
in market performance spread the information, if direct exchange by

99. Id. at 806-07.
100. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 60, at 2-3.
101. VoN HIPPEL, supro note 92, at 76-79.
102. See Kitch, supra note 36, at 714.
103. Kitch explains the openness he describes as the result of several traits of information. First,
complex information is difficult to steal or transmit, it is usually not assembled, and it is embedded
in extraneous information. Second, information has a high depreciation rate, unless it is technology
or customer relations information; this is the kind of information that courts protect. Third, markets
for stolen information are hard to organize. Much value of information is specific in time and
place. Id. at 711-15.
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licensing, barter, or espionage do not. 1°4 The firms are in touch with
each other, whether through formal or informal channels. Each firm has
an incentive to control access to information about its activities, in order
to maximize its edge over its rivals. 105 The scope of incentives to hide
and to learn is much broader than the mere identity of the innovation.
Only where there is some tangible benefit to cooperation will a firm
disclose any information of value, and it is hard to be sure that information has no value. The strength of legal protection as a factor in
innovation may be of minor importance or even irrelevant, as the innovation process is driven primarily by more powerful technological and
economic factors, and positive appropriability conditions do not guarantee
innovative output. Patent and trade secrecy use may not indicate a need
for legal support for appropriability (and thus a role for supplemental
trade secret protection), but instead may signal the opportunities provided
to some industries by the design of the existing patent system; a different
intellectual property scheme might produce different competitive strategies.
Intellectual property law functions as a backdrop for a lively interactive
process. Trade secret law is one of the balls in play. A firm's trade
secret strategy or claim is alive in its commercial setting. It is created,
used and retired according to the logic of the technology which is its
subject, as that unfolds in its native market conditions. How is the
character of trade secrecy changed when it is transplanted from its common
law origins into a regulatory scheme?
II.

COMPETING CLAIMS TO TRADE SECRET INFORMATION

Chemical pollution absorbs substantial resources, yet its effects are
poorly understood. The market does not produce much information about
pollution, because this type of data is both a public good and a negative
description of a private good. 10 6 In the absence of a well-developed
information context, the market not only discourages firms from producing data about side effects, but encourages ignorance and deception. 0 7

104. It is hard to document the espionage process, but in the literature one regularly comes across
informal remarks about it. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, On Approving Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 1991, at D2. Freudenheim quotes a Mr. Snyder at Biocraft, "There really aren't many
secrets in the drug business. As far as manufacturing goes, if there is a secret, somebody will steal
it." Id; see STEVENSON, JR., supra note 2.
105. Reinganum, supra note 73. Firms need to know how well an innovation is working and
what its costs and benefits are turning out to be in other firms. Id. The costs and timing of this
information will affect the decision to adopt and thus become part of each firm's strategy of
learning and secrecy. Id.
106. Mary Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce
and Use Data, 87 MicH. L. REV. 1795 (1989). Manufacturing firms do conduct research on the
effects of their activities, but it is inadequate. Id. This should not be surprising, though a contrary
assumption is regularly made. Where effects are dispersed, of complex origin and latent, manufacturers
are not situated to study and identify these impacts. Frank Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A
Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971).
107. There are fairly strong incentives to deceive others about such effects. Research by firms
about their own products need not be actively false to be less than adequate. This is a familiar
theme in regulation. See BoK, supra note 2, at 148-50; Richard Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology
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Yet greater understanding of pollution effects is needed throughout society
in medical, legal, and administrative agency practice, in public research,
and in the marketplace. Private persons who are interested in it often
do not have the financial assets to buy it, nor can they organize; and
if it is kept secret, it may not even be visible to prospective purchasers.
Our system for studying polluting technologies is rigged together from
disparate elements: disclosure rules, manufacturers' studies, and public
investments in research. Yet, these sources do not supply a full picture,

so that regulators must often do without information. In the context of
evolving technologies and choices about the shape of the future, information gaps may have significant opportunity costs.
Knowledge about pollution has some interesting idiosyncracies. It is
both concentrated and dispersed and it includes both expert knowledge
and lay "local knowledge."'' 8 Epidemiologists, toxicologists, and ecologists gather and assess data on the dispersed effects of manufacturing
technologies. Enriching the data base builds understanding and a broad
exchange of information is basic to this process. 109 Two types of local
knowledge are prerequisites to expert research. First, description of the
pollution, including its identity, amount, and location. Second, description
of symptoms or effects which may be associated with an exposure.
Information of both types is in short supply." 0 Indeed, the lack of this
information (which will be referred to as health or environmental information)' " is a defining characteristic of contemporary regulation. To
the extent local knowledge about pollution is controlled and withdrawn
from circulation, research is hindered.

of Cancer: The Need for a More Balanced View, 384 NATURE 297, 297-300 (1980); ALAN GABBAY,
THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF TEST DATA UNDER FIFRA, 2 H.E.L.R. 378, 389-90 (1978); Sidney Shapiro,
Divorcing the Profit Motivation from New Drug Research: A Consideration of Proposals to Provide
the FDA With Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155 (1978). Until an information context is
developed, making identification and rating of effects less costly, there will be little or no competition
in this dimension. Lyndon, supra note 106.
108. This is "the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521 (1945).
109. Communication is basic to science, along with some degree of confidentiality to encourage
the completion of research. Eisenberg, supra note 1; NELSON & WINTER, supra note 60, at 391-92.
The access problem which is the subject of this article is not access to incomplete research results,
but to completed health studies and to raw data on exposures.
As toxicology, epidemiology, and ecology develop, their information needs may diminish. See
JOHN D. GRAHAM et al., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY 3 (1988) (noting this trend concerning research on
the causes of cancer). In the meantime, improvements in the science on cancer seem to demand
more, not less, exposure information in cancer risk assessment and in epidemiology. See Howard
Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89 (1988); Mary
Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Legitimacy, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (1989).
110. Lyndon, supra note 106.
Ill. The language to describe the information shortfall isundeveloped. The term "trade secret"
is easy to use and carries resonances of privacy and property that are meaningful in lay and
specialized usage. But the most common regulatory term for the information which I suggest is
underproduced (data on negative physical externalities from chemical and related technologies) is
HSE data, or is "health, safety and environmental" information. This is both awkward and ambiguous
and seems a specialized, even narrow, category. This is a curious inversion since the environment
is our context and chemicals are dispersed pervasively in it.
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What are the impacts of protecting secrecy in this context? Does the
substantive value of the compromise between publication and secrecy,
already struck in intellectual property law, change when individual medical
choices or the public research agenda are included in the balance?
The transplant of trade secrecy from the common law to regulation
also provokes some questions concerning the capacities of the two legal
formats. Trade secrecy evolved in the flexible and small scale format of

the common law case, in which the court can rely heavily on equitable
considerations. A common law court need not articulate a very definite
rule and can craft a remedy appropriate to the case at hand. The parties
have a rivalry relationship and the court is positioned to acquire a fair
degree of understanding of the nature of the individual dispute. Environmental regulation, on the other hand, at least as currently constructed,
applies to whole industries, is highly exposed, and generally functions
by promulgating broad standards. When regulators work with a concept
which has been transplanted from the common law, how do they transform
the original principle?
A.

Disclosure Law
Conflicts over confidentiality in regulation began to recur in the case
law of the late 1970's and early 1980's. The usual statutory mandate for
regulatory practice provides that data which firms submit to an agency
may be withheld from disclosure to rivals and the public if the data is
a trade secret or "confidential.' ' 12 The relationship between such provisions and two other statutes, the Federal Trade Secrets Act ("FTSA")"3
prohibition of disclosure of "proprietary information" by government
employees and Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),

112. Environmental provisions include, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1988), 40 C.F.R. § 2.301(a)(2)
(1991), and 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (1988). Early EPA regulations also stipulated that data concerning
pollution would not be withheld.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988). The FTSA authorizes criminal penalties for government employees
who disclose "proprietary information," unless the disclosure is authorized by law. The statute
originated from several nineteenth-century statutes intended to deal with unauthorized disclosure of
business information by field agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Tariff Commission,
and the Department of Commerce. The early versions did not focus on trade secrets, but when
they were codified in 1948, trade secrets were specifically mentioned as covered material. Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296-301 (setting history); see Mark Q. Connelly, Secrets and
Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosure of Business Data, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 207, 236 (1981).
When Chrysler raised the FTSA as authority for preventing the release under the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") of data related to affirmative action and employment discrimination,
the Supreme Court held that FTSA protection of trade secret information does not prevent an
agency from releasing such information. While FOIA itself does not provide the authorization for
release which is a defense under the FTSA, agency regulations can provide such authorization.
Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 295-96, 302-03, 316-17, 319; see General Elec. Co. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1399 (7th Cir. 1984) (an agency's own rules may not
grant the public less access to its records than FOIA would, but can be broader). The courts have
generally treated the trade secret coverage of the FTSA and Exemption 4 of FOIA as co-terminous.
Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 319 n.49. But see General Elec. Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1402 (7th Cir. 1984) (FTSA protects a narrower category of interests,
where disclosure "could be devastating to the owners and not just harmful").
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which protects "trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial
information" from disclosure,11 4 was the subject of several early cases." 15
The disclosure issues were most thoroughly developed in the drug and
pesticide contexts, two regulatory schemes which require research by firms.
In several FOIA cases that concerned disputes over disclosure of health
and safety information that had been submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia articulated a broad disclosure rationale."' 6 A separate
line of cases addressed the problem in the context of the pesticide
regulatory scheme, established by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")." 7 The FIFRA cases culminated in the Supreme Court's decision on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,"' which acknowledged agencies' broad authority to disclose trade secrets in the course
of regulation. This authority has generally not been exercised; agencies
have tended to act cautiously, even fearfully, when dealing with proprietary
claims to information.
In its early years, the FDA refused to release data that fell within the
Restatement's broad definition of trade secrecy. After the enactment of
FOIA the FDA changed its policy, and later legislative mandates further
encouraged disclosure. Yet, the agency continued to withhold health and
safety data claimed as confidential." 9 The United States Court of Appeals

114. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), (c) (1988). FOIA directs agencies to release on request any information
in their possession, except data which falls within nine exempted categories. The exemptions are to
be construed narrowly. Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738,
742 (9th Cir. 1979). Exemption 3 covers information "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Exemption 4 covers "trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." Id. § 552(b)(4). The Supreme
Court has interpreted Exemption 4 to authorize, but not to require, agency withholding of the
information. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1978). The second prong of Exemption 4
hinges on whether the documents are "confidential;" courts ask whether disclosure will (1) impair
the government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future or (2) "cause substantial
harm to the competitive position" of the submitter. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton,
498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The agency's determination is reviewed under the "arbitrary
or capricious" standard. One factor is whether such information is customarily released to the
public. Racal-Milgo Gov. Sys. Inc. v. Small Business Admin., 559 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1981);
AT&T Info. Sys. Inc. v. General Serv. Admin., 627 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1986) (bid information).
Dicta in Chrysler Corp., however, suggests that the coverage of Exemption 4 and the FTSA are
coterminous. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 319, n.49; see Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center,
Inc. v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 279, 285 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Connelly, supra note 113 at 221
(discussing controversy over FOIA's authorization of agency discretion on disclosure and explaining
the justifications for doing so). Connelly also disputes the allegation that FOIA is commonly used
as a tool of industrial espionage. Connelly, supra note 113, at 209-10.
115. See Connelly, supra note 113. These decisions were made against the background of federal
statutes containing explicit protections for trade secret information. Id. at 243 n.173; Linda B.
Samuels, Protecting Confidential Business Information Supplied to State Governmental: Exempting
Trade Secrets From State Open Records Laws, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1989).
116. See, e.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (1974).
117. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988); see Mobay Chem. Corp. v. Costle, 518 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (disclosure provisions of FIFRA do not violate Fifth Amendment).
118. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
119. In 1974, after the passage of FOIA, the FDA reversed its earlier practice of keeping confidential
most information submitted to it. The basic policy became one of releasing health and safety
information at the time of the product approval. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602 (1974); 21 C.F.R. § 20.1
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for the District of Columbia examined this practice in Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Administration,120 where a
consumer advocacy group sought information about ongoing clinical
studies of intraocular lenses from the FDA. Noting earlier similar readings
of the common law, the court rejected the Restatement definition of
trade secrets as "overly broad" and "ill suited for the public law context
in which FOIA determinations must be made." It found that the common
law intends to protect data which is directly connected to the production21

process and, therefore, health and safety data are not trade secrets.

The court also limited the scope of "confidential commercial or financial
information," the second prong of FOIA's Exemption 4, to the common
law rule which protects only against harm from a rivals' competitive use
of proprietary information. Thus, the agency may not withhold confidential information on the basis that it may be embarrassing to the firm
or might cause "customer or employee disgruntlement." Health and safety
studies might be withheld under this rule only if the firm made a strong
showing that their release would affect its position in relation to its

rivals. 122
(1992). The FDA, however, continues to treat health and safety studies and data as subject to
Exemption 4 of FOIA. This policy has been criticized. See the arguments and sources in Robert
M. Halperin, comment, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Effectiveness Data: A Legal and Policy
Analysis, 1979 DUtK L.J. 286 (1979); Richard S. Fortunato, Comment, FDA Disclosure of Safety
and Efficacy Data: The Scope of Section 301(j), 52 FORDHAm L. Rav. 1280 (1984). It is now being
formally reconsidered.
120. 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 1286-87; see Anderson v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936 (10th
Cir. 1990) (personal injury plaintiff obtained health and safety studies and related documents under
protective order in state court, then sought public disclosure of documents pursuant to FOIA in
order to warn others of the dangers of liquid silicone injections); Van Strum v. EPA, 680 F. Supp.
349 (D. Or. 1987), 881 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1989), on reappeal, 892 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1990);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82 (3d. Cir.
1977) (finding agency's disclosure policy authorized by statute and is constitutional); see also Critical
Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 830 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (NRC must
establish, pursuant to "confidential, commercial information" provision of FOIA Exemption 4, that
disclosure would impair its ability to obtain necessary information in the future); CNA Fin. Corp.
v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (district court's determination that affirmative action
information did not come within the competitive harm exemption was reasonable); AT&T Info.
Sys., Inc. v. General Servs. Admin., 627 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1986); Teich v. Food & Drug
Admin., 751 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1990) (animal studies on the health effects of breast implants
were not confidential commercial information protected from disclosure by Exemption 4, as release
of studies showing negative effects would be in the public interest, the disclosure request did not
seek raw data on other studies, and some of the studies were 20 years old and would not affect
the competitive positions of the manufacturer); St. Paul's Benevolent Educ. & Missionary Inst. v.
United States, 506 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (timing of release of data on feeding of infants
in low-income families submitted to Centers for Disease Control could not be controlled as submitter
was not placed at competitive disadvantage, had not kept it secret, and was type of information
normally disclosed); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504
F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (disclosure of scientific research submitted to National Institute of Mental
Health would not place submitter at competitive disadvantage as it was not-for-profit institution),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Brockway v. Dep't of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir.
1975) (witness statements regarding airplane crash); Consumers Union v. Veterans' Admin., 301 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
122. Public Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1291 n.30; General Elec. Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 750 F. Supp. 1394, 1402 (7th Cir. 1984); CNA Fin. Corp., 830 F.2d at 1154; Badhwar
v. Department of the Air Force, 622 F. Supp. at 1364, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,'23
where Monsanto claimed that the EPA had effected an unconstitutional
taking for private use by sharing its health and safety studies with another
company. The FIFRA statutory scheme provided that the EPA could
rely on one pesticide registrant's studies to evaluate another's application.
It also provided that the later applicant must reimburse the first one for
the use of the studies and, if an agreement could not be reached,
arbitration would settle the matter.' 24 The controlling statute had been
revised twice in the time period relevant to the case. The 1947 statute
was silent, but in the 1972 version of the law, there was an explicit
statutory promise of confidentiality. The 1978 amendments reversed this
to disclose health and
by explicitly establishing the agency's authority
125
public.
the
to
and
rivals
to
data
safety
The Supreme Court found that Monsanto had an interest in the data
which was in the nature of a property interest in trade secrets and that
the extent of this interest was controlled by state common law and was
not subject to federal agency modification. 26 The Court held, however,
that the EPA's use of the data was not a taking, except during the
period in which the company had a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" of confidentiality, from 1972 until 1978, when Congress had
explicitly given such an assurance. 27 The Court affirmed the police power
authority of the EPA to disclose this type of information in the course
of regulation' 28 and held that the FTSA is not a guarantee of confidentiality
to submitters of data because the FTSA does not provide a basis for
of confidentiality in a regulatory field where health issues
an expectation 29
are a concern.

123. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
125. The 1978 amendments overruled Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 517 F. Supp. 252 (W.D.
Pa. 1981), aff'd, 682 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, (459 U.S. 988 (1982), and Chevron Chemical
Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
126. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04 (EPA had stipulated that the company had protected
proprietary interests in the data, but the Court undertook its own analysis). Pamela Samuelson has
done a careful analysis of the case and the Court's treatment of the property issue. See Pamela
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction
in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989). Samuelson notes that the Court
seemed to rely on state law, but actually just stated that Missouri law has adopted the Restatement
definition of trade secrets and cited three state cases, two of which did not hold that trade secrets
are property and the third of which was decided two decades prior to the Restatement's publication.
Id. at 379.
127. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005.
128. Id. at 1016. The Court found that the EPA's use had been for a public purpose. The Court
stated that it is for Congress to decide on the optimum amount of disclosure, but observed that
"public disclosure can provide an effective check on the decisionmaking of EPA and allows members
of the public to determine the likelihood of individualized risks peculiar to their use of the product."
Id.
129. Id. at 1009.
In an industry that has long been the focus of great public concern and significant
government regulation, the possibility was substantial that the Federal Government,
which had thus far taken no position on disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data concerning pesticides, upon focusing on the issue, would find
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The Ruckelshaus decision set some basic ground rules for agencies
handling environmental information. First, the scope of the proprietary
interest is determined by common law. 30 Second, the agency need not
recognize or defer to it in any way which is different from deference
accorded other interests which may be affected by an exercise of the
police power. Third,' in areas where health protection is an apparent

concern, expectations of confidentiality are not reasonable absent some
affirmative assurance from Congress. "3I

The Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus was made in 1984, when
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") was establishing its hazard communication standard, which would become the
model for handling trade secrecy in federal right-to-know and toxics
The agency's initial policy was consistent with the
inventory programs.'
Supreme Court's broad permission to agencies to require disclosure, but
later it changed to a posture that was highly deferential to trade secret
claims.' Since the OSHA process laid the groundwork for later federal
regulatory approaches to the problem, it is worth examining in some
detail.
OSHA first proposed its hazard communication standard in the last
days of the Carter Administration. This version would have required
disclosure of chemical identity without a trade secret exemption, but it
invited comment on this point. 3 4 The agency then issued a modified
proposal,' 35 which required broad disclosure using a two-tiered approach:

disclosure to be in the public interest.
Id. at 1008-09.
Although a compensable taking of that property could occur to the extent the claimant had a
reasonable investment-backed expectation of protection of the property, in fields where regulation
is likely, such an expectation will exist only if it is affirmatively encouraged by the legislature. It
took a statute promising confidentiality to create such an expectation in this setting and lower courts
have read the decision this way. Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 623 F. Supp.
1066, 1076 (M.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 815 (1987); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J.
1985). This reading is criticized in John C. Jenka, comment, Federal Disclosure Statutes and the
Fifth Amendment: The New Status of Trade Secrets, 54 Cm. L. REv. 334 (1987). In Ruckelshaus,
Justice O'Connor would have remanded for factfinding on actual expectations prior to the statutes.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1024.
130. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001-04.
131. Id. at 1009.
132. State laws were also influenced by the OSHA standard. State right-to-know requirements
proliferated in the late 1970's and early 1980's and mandated disclosure of the identity and nature
of workplace hazards from chemical exposure. State statutes varied in their treatment of trade
secrets. Some provided protection; others gave limited protection, depending on the toxicity of the
chemicals; and others required full disclosure of all hazards. States also established different procedures
for claiming and contesting trade secrecy. See Lyndon, supra note 106.
133. The rule's history suggests that the policymaking process was influenced by a new policy
initiative introduced by the Reagan Administration. Lyndon, supra note 106 (discussing privatization
in the 1980's of government data, encouragement of private information service, and the issues
raised by these policies).
134. 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4426-27 (1981).
135. 47 Fed. Reg. 12,092, 12,105-06 (1982). This proposal was modeled on New Jersey's law,
which was similar in this respect to that of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Disclosure was required
for carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens, and chemicals which cause significant irreversible damage to
human organs or body systems. Id.
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employers could withhold trade secret data unless the chemicals were a
"high chronic hazard," and there existed a need to know the precise
chemical names. OSHA declared that disclosure of chemical identity data
is crucial to a hazard communication system since it is "the passkey to
the scientific literature." OSHA pointed out that workers, scientists, and
purchasers of chemical products must be able to consult others about
the hazards in the workplace and they cannot do this without knowing
the chemical identity of the substances. 136 The agency noted that a chemical
may be a trade secret in one work context and not in another, though
it will be equally hazardous in either place. It also noted that since trade
secrecy is basically a matter of self-definition, permitting nondisclosure
of trade secrets might result in considerable overclassification of trade
secrets. OSHA acknowledged that it did not have the resources to screen
or adjudicate all trade secret claims and pointed to the availability of
civil remedies for injured trade secret claimants. Finally, it explained that
the compromise it reached was an attempt to balance the two competing
interests, but that any unavoidable conflict should be decided in favor
of the health interest.'37
As part of the rulemaking, OSHA completed a Regulatory Impact
Analysis ("RIA"), which concluded that the value of the rules' benefits
in the form of reduced mortality and disabling illness, fewer lost workdays,
lower medical costs, increased production, and fewer turnovers, would
be nearly twice their costs. 3 ' Concerning trade secrets, the RIA noted
that smaller firms might be affected if they rely on a few unique chemical
products or processes, but comparative advantages in small firms, which
rely less on secrecy than on location or individual abilities, would be
unaffected.3 9 It also suggested that most chemical R&D has been con-

136. 47 Fed. Reg. 12,107.
Since exact chemical identity is the passkey to the scientific literature, this information
must be available to an industrial hygienist or other health professional who is
evaluating the hazards associated with a chemical, attempting to double-check a
hazard identification made by somebody else, or updating an earlier evaluation with
the latest scientific knowledge. Likewise, it must be available to an epidemiologist
who is attempting to link patterns of disease with exposure to a particular chemical;
to a downstream employer who may be contemplating using a chemical in conjunction
with other chemicals or in a manner not foreseen by the manufactures; and to a
treating physician who suspects that a patient's health problems may be the result
of chemical exposure.
Id. at 12,105-06.
137. 47 Fed. Reg. 12,107. OSHA located its authority to require disclosure of trade secrets in
federal preemption doctrine. It noted that, in analogous situations, courts have adopted a balancing
approach favorable to health and safety interests and cited section 15 of the OSHA Act (29 U.S.C.
664) and American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), where the
Supreme Court found that, in passing OSHA's authorizing legislation, Congress itself decided that
hard cost and benefit choices must be guided by a rule that favors employee health. See also 47
Fed. Reg. 12,107-08. But see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
138. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,329 (1983).
139. Final Regulatory Impact Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Hazard Communications Proposal, U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA (Aug. 9, 1983).
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ducted by four firms.140 Disclosure might contribute to industry concentration, but a study of regulation and chemical innovation conducted by
the Conservation Foundation had concluded that earlier regulation had
not had that effect. The authors of that study concluded that regulatory
delay is likely to be a more important factor in innovation decisions
than direct costs.' 4' Because the OSHA standard would not introduce
delays, the RIA found that the impact on innovation would be minor.
The RIA also noted that since reverse engineering is available for most
chemical mixtures, common law trade secrecy standards can rarely be
met anyway. Innovation and appropriability rationales were therefore
assessed and found too weak to trump the need for disclosure.
After the Reagan Administration took office, however, OSHA issued

its final rule, and a dramatic change in its view of trade secrets was
evident. OSHA rejected the industry argument that only general hazards
and risk estimates should be communicated, and it confirmed the requirement of chemical identity disclosure for most substances; however,
OSHA now spoke of "[t]he critical need to protect trade secret information
because the economic well-being of the employer and its employees may
be dependent upon the protection of such information, and once lost,
its value as a trade secret cannot be recaptured."' ' 42 Unlike the RIA's
conclusions, OSHA's final position focused only on the present private
value of the trade secrets and not on the social value of disclosure. Nor
was the central argument essentially an economic one; it focused not on
encouraging innovation, but on protecting existing stakes.
The final rule removed the provision that high chronic hazards must
be disclosed. 43 It strictly limited access to trade secret chemical identities,
barring access even by workers and their designated representatives. Only
health professionals were now included and firms could require them to
agree to terms of liquidated or punitive damages in confidentiality agree-

140. Id. Over 60% of R&D funds for industrial chemicals are spent by four companies; only
2076
of TSCA notices are submitted by firms with sales under $10 million. Davies notes that some
industry representatives maintain the latter figure reflects TSCA's effect on the industry, not the
low likelihood that it will affect industry structure. J. Clarence Davies, The Effects of Federal
Regulation on Chemical Industry Innovation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 41, 47 (1983).
-Regulatory effects would vary among companies, but overall the chemical industry has consistently
been an especially healthy sector of the economy. See E. C. Holmer, The Chemical Industry:
Challenges, Risks, Rewards, in RALPH LANDAU & NATHAN ROSENBERG, Tr

POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY

(1986). The chemical industry has been generating a favorable trade balance in excess of $10 billion.
141. Product Regulation and Innovation, THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION,

Mar. 1980, at E-3.

142. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,312.
143. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,315-16. The proposal had equated "high chronic hazard" with any "carcinogen, mutagen, teratogen, or a cause of significant irreversible damage to human organs or body
systems." OSHA found little support in the comments for making distinctions between these chemicals
and other hazardous chemicals. Some commenters criticized the lack of definitions for the critical
terms which made the provision vague. Exs. 19-44, 19-46, 19-63, 19-65, 19-76, 19-89, 19-109, 19123, 19-155, 19-164, 19-196, 19-204, 19-219; Tr. 2185, 2200-1, 1214. Some thought that unless
narrowly defined, the terms would result in trade secrets being categorized too often as "high
chronic hazards." Exs. 19-44, 19-46. On the other hand, the American Lung Association commented
that chemicals which cause acute toxic effects should be disclosed regardless of trade secrecy. Ex.
19-154. The Federal Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and Health, Ex. 125, and the AFLCIO and supporting unions recommended the use of more inclusive terms, Ex. 180A.
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ments.'44 OSHA also broadened the Restatement definition of trade secrets,
adding a phrase intended to provide protection for chemical identities,
whether or not they could be discovered by reverse engineering.
To explain its turnabout, OSHA quoted extensively from the comments
of the Chemical Manufacturers Association and several companies which
had maintained that disclosure of generic chemical names, accompanied
by any existing health effects information, should be sufficient health
protection. The flavors and fragrance industry took the lead, arguing
that disclosure of chemical identity would have disastrous economic consequences for some companies. 45 This claim was lent rhetorical force by
invocation of "competition" on the side of secrecy, with the suggestion
that disclosure will cause "competitive harm," in that the claimant's
market position relative to its rivals might be affected.'"6
Numerous manufacturers, as well as unions and public health experts,
were in favor of disclosure.' 47 "Downstream" employers, who purchase

144. This requirement had earlier been rejected by OSHA in the context of medical record access.
A number of commenters stated that confidentiality agreements, with or without bonding or liquidated
damages provisions, would be ineffective in protecting their economic interests. Bonding appeared
especially to be unavailable under these circumstances. 48 Fed. Reg. at 53,319; see, e.g., the comments
of the flavor and fragrance industries in Ex. 27-15, and the AFL-CIO, Ex. 180A. OSHA found
that liquidated damages provisions might provide clarity, which it termed a benefit for both parties.
48 Fed. Reg. 53,319.
145. The flavors and fragrance manufacturers appear to have been the group most concerned
with the rule. They argued that trade secret information should be disclosed only in those cases
where there is a significant hazard to workers and the disclosure will significantly alleviate the
hazard. D. Thompson, Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association, Fragrance Materials Association, Ex. 27-15, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,318. See also the comments of Master Chemical, Inc., small
chemical processors. Ex. 19-87, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,313.
The comments contained little evidence of the value of any trade secrets. The Chemical Manufacturers Association was driven to make the completely circular argument that:
the very existence of the extensive legal protection afforded under the patent system
and trade secret law attests to the importance of encouraging research by permitting
those who develop a new product to obtain financial rewards from the sale of that
product.
48 Fed. Reg. 53,313.
146. Milgrim uses the term "competitive" in this sense. Stevenson notes this is inexact and
overbroad, if not self-serving. Stevenson, supra note 2, at 8-9. Disclosure and diffusion as well
may serve competition. See section 1.Scherer provided the term rivalry to indicate the individual
firms' relationship, as opposed to the market's dynamic. See SCHERER, supra note 80.
147. For example, Caterpillar Tractor Company disputed both arguments made against disclosure:
Some chemical manufacturers have contended that the use of generic classifications,
in conjunction with their assessment of the potential hazards, would provide sufficient
information for users to determine the requirement for safe usage. We feel that
their argument falls short since chemical manufacturers cannot be familiar with the
variety of ways in which their products may ultimately be used. With modern
analytical laboratory equipment, and a limited amount of time and funding, the
constituents of most chemical products can be readily identified ....
We feel that benefits to be derived in fully disclosing the constituents of a hazardous
material far outweigh the risk (real or imagined) that may be incurred by chemical
manufacturers as a result of disclosing this information.
The American Paper Institute, Ex. 1973, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,313. Unions and other employee advocates
argued that only the basic confidentiality agreements permitted by the medical records access rule
should be permitted. Exhibits cited at 48 Fed. Reg. 53,313. For instance, the AFL-CIO maintained
that chemical identity, not hazard warning information, is the essential ingredient of.a hazard
communication standard. Ex. 180A.
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chemicals from chemical manufacturers, generally expressed views similar
to the unions. For instance, the Caterpillar Tractor Company commented
that identifying chemicals by broad generic chemical classifications would
substantially hinder the efforts of its safety and health professionals to
determine the requirements for safe usage of specific products.' 48 Several
firms expressed skepticism about the extent or value of actual secrecy
in the chemicals industry.
There was also testimony that with modern gas chromatography and
mass spectrometry, laboratory analysis of the chemical content of any
product is so easy that chemical identity cannot properly be considered
secret 49 The proponents of confidentiality argued that the cost of analyzing mixtures will often be high and, even then, the precise identity
often will not be decipherable. 5 0 Unions responded that, on this basis,
much information will only be kept secret from those without financial
resources-from workers rather than from trade rivals.' 5'
On petition for review, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that
OSHA had defined "trade secret" too broadly and had imposed burdensome conditions on access to information. 5 2 While trade secret protection may arise either from state law or from federal statute,'5 3 the
court found that the OSHA Act does not create trade secret protection,

148. The Caterpillar Tractor Company testified along with West Point Pepperell, The National
Paint and Coatings Association, and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association that precise
chemical identity is essential to downstream employers hazard assessment.
149. Caterpillar Tractor Company, Ex. 19-20; California Dep't of Industrial Relations, Ex. 22C8. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,314.
150. The CMA cited a Proctor & Gamble estimate that an analysis of its Bold-3, would cost as
much as $300,000 and might still be unsuccessful. Ex. 19-91, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,314; Mr. Wallace
Dempsey, Fragrance Materials Association, Tr. 3417. Master Chemical Corporation testified that
the cost of the procedures ranged from between $50,000 and $1 million dollars or more per sample,
with no guarantee that the exact composition will be determined. Ex. 19-87.
151. A representative of the United Steelworkers of America testified:
Typically a trade secret is claimed in a case where a solvent manufacturer's supplier,
for example, takes a-let's say an aliphatic hydrocarbon and adds a chlorinated
hydrocarbon to raise the flash point, sells it as safety solvent, charges three times
for the mixture what his costs were for the ingredient, says that's trade secret.
Now, you know, in all those cases the buyer or a competitor could easily obtain
it and analyze it, if they cared to. So it's really not a trade secret from anyone
except the workers forced to use it.
Mr. Michael Wright, Tr. 854, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,314.
152. United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 739 (3d Cir. 1985). The agency's
authority to preempt state laws was upheld. Id. OSHA's rules applied only to the manufacturing
sector, but the court ordered the agency to promulgate standards for other industries, unless it
could state why such standards would not be feasible.
The Third Circuit later ruled specifically on preemption of trade secrets. In New Jersey State
Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 724
F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985), several industry associations and some companies sought to enjoin the
implementation of New Jersey's Right-to-Know Law on the ground that the OSHA regulations
preempted the state law and that the law's trade secret provisions constituted a compensable taking.
The district court agreed that the OSHA regulations preempted the state law as to manufacturing
employers, found that trade secrets are constitutionally protected property rights under New Jersey
law, and held that mandated disclosures of trade secrets were not "takings" which triggered a right
to compensation.
153. Ruckelshaus v. Mansanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1008, (1984); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641
F.2d 104, 115 (3d. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
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but directs the agency to treat data as trade secrets only to the extent
that state law does so.11 4 OSHA's elaboration on the Restatement definition

of trade secrets was therefore improper.
On its own initiative, the court noted that the agency's earlier proposal,
which required full disclosure of hazardous ingredients, was consistent
with OSHA's statement of its general policy "that the interests of employee
safety and health are best served by full disclosure of chemical identity
information."' ' 5 The court also discussed the basic relationship between
trade secrecy and regulation. Citing its own decision in Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission5 6 and
the Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus, it stated that trade secrets
are not constitutionally protected from the regulatory process.5 7 The
court bluntly told OSHA that it need not be so cautious: "These cases
suggest that a regulation requiring disclosure even of formula or process
information as a precondition for the sale of hazardous products for use
in the workplace would be valid."'5 8 The court noted that section 6 of
the Act directs the agency to set standards to assure that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health effects,5 9 and quoted the Supreme Court's decision in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.
Donovan, 60 finding that the agency is not permitted to balance employee
safety against competing economic concerns. The court remanded the
trade secrecy rule for reconsideration of the definition of trade secrets,
with the specific instruction that it not include chemical identity information that is readily discoverable through reverse engineering. 16
OSHA's final standard preserved trade secret access almost as it was
before the court of appeals decision. An employer may withhold any
chemical identity information claimed as a trade secret, but must specify
on warning labels that it is doing so. Disclosure to workers, medical
personnel, and researchers may be conditioned on signing a confidentiality
agreement, which may include stipulation of a "reasonable pre-estimate62
of likely damages," but may not require the posting of a penalty bond.
Conflicts over information requests are 63resolved by appeal to the agency,
a laborious process for the petitioner.

154. 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1988).
155. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,312 (1983); United Steelworkers, 763 F.2d at 741-42.
156. 555 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1977).
157. United Steelworkers, 763 F.2d at 741.
158. Id.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988).
160. 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (interpreting section 6(b)(5) of the Act).
161. United Steelworkers, 763 F.2d at 743.
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (1991).
163. Id. § 1900.1200. A manufacturer or employer may withhold chemical identity from a Material
Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS") provided that (i) the trade secret claim can be supported; (ii) the
MSDS contains the information concerning the properties and effects of the chemical; (iii) the
MSDS indicates that the information is being withheld as a trade secret; and (iv) the specific
chemical identity is made available to a treating physician or nurse on an emergency basis without
qualifying statements of agreements and in a nonemergency to an employee, union representative
or health professional who gives a detailed statement of the need for the information and signs a
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The OSHA rule has become the model for other federal environmental
information programs. The 1986 Amendments to the Superfund law
established the two new information programs. 64 One of these is the
National Toxics Inventory165("NTI"), a survey of discharges of about 300
specified toxic chemicals.
Disclosure of specific chemical identity was a difficult issue in EPA's
rulemaking on reporting requirements for the NTI, 66 but secrecy advocates
were even more successful here than at OSHA . 67 Although the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA") aims to protect
trade secrecy, its major thrust is disclosure to facilitate pollution control

written confidentiality agreement. The employee who denies a request for access must do so in
writing within thirty days of the request and include evidence to substantiate the trade secret claim,
state the reasons why the request is being denied and explain in detail how alternative information
may satisfy the specific medical or occupational health need without revealing the specific chemical
identity.
The person whose request is denied may then refer the matter to OSHA, which shall consider
the evidence to determine if: (i) the'trade secret claim has been supported; (ii) the claim that there
is a medical or occupational health need for the information has been supported; and (iii) the
requester has demonstrated adequate means to protect confidentiality.
If OSHA decides that the information is not a trade secret or that the requester has made the
requisite demonstration, the manufacturer will be subject to citation. If the requester's showing of
ability to protect the information is insufficient, OSHA may issue an order releasing the information,
but require additional protection for it. If, after OSHA orders release and issues citations, the
chemical manufacturer continues to withhold the information, the matter may be referred to the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for enforcement of the citation. An administrative
law judge may review the citation in camera and issue appropriate protective orders.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 11042 (1988). The first program requires all companies which are subject to
the OSHA hazard communication standard to disclose the amounts and locations of stored toxic
chemicals to local government agencies concerned with emergency preparedness. It also directs the
companies and localities to take steps to be prepared for emergency spills or releases. This program
is decentralized, like OSHA's, and has suffered from uneven implementation due to lack of funding.
The trade secret provisions in the statute leave considerable discretion about disclosure in the hands
of the local agencies.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11042, 11043, 11048 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 350 to 350.40 (1992).
166. Comments of several toxicologists stressed the importance of access to chemical identity
data. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; Docket Number 300-PQ-TS, Comments of William
H. McBeath, M.D., M.P.H. Executive Director, American Public Health Association and Fran
DuMelle, Director, Government Relations, American Lung Association; Comments of Thomas L.
Kurt M.D., M.P.H., North Central Texas Poison Center; Comments of Geoffrey A. Langley,
Corporate Manager of Emergency Response, Petrochem Services, Inc., a hazardous material emergency
cleanup contractor; Comments of Deborah Sheiman, Natural Resources Defense Council; comments
of Gary D. Bass, Ph.D., Executive Director of OMB Watch. But see, e.g., Comments of Richard
C. Wilson, Jr., of Ashland Petroleum company (stating that commercial experience with toll-free
hotline indicates that health professionals inquire about emergency procedures, but rarely about
specific chemical identity of trade secret ingredients); Comments of James T. O'Reilly, Corporation
Counsel-Product Safety, Procter & Gamble Company (saying that specific chemical identity not
generally necessary for specific diagnosis as "a genuinely interested health professional already knows
much about the illness or acute reaction, from differential diagnoses that differentiate among causative
factors.").
167. The final NTI rule provides that to withhold a chemical identity a firm must show that
disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the company's competitive position, the chemical
identity is not "readily discoverable" through reverse engineering or analysis of the company's
discharges or products, and the information has not been disclosed, except under legal compulsion
or the cloak of a confidentiality agreement. Also, the information must not be subject to disclosure
under any federal or state law. OMB WATCH, USING COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW: A GUIDE TO
NEW FEDERAL LAW; 42 U.S.C. § 11042.
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and emergency preparedness. 6 Nevertheless, trade secret claimants persuaded the EPA that Congress intended to preclude disclosure of specific
health effects data, if this would reveal trade secret chemical identity.
The problem would arise in some cases because so little study has been
done on the health effects of many chemicals that to reveal a known
effect will identify the chemical. The EPA, believing that trade secrecy
is a "property" interest that requires a "balancing of interests," has
established an informal practice of crafting health effects descriptions so
as not to reveal chemical identity.' 69 For example, EPA's rule allows a
claimant to report "organ effects," if the identity of the particular body
organ affected would contribute to a discovery of the offending chemical's
identity. 70 Critics of this approach have pointed out that such general
descriptions are medically useless. 7 '
The EPA's resolution of the matter is consistent with the FDA's and
OSHA's persistence in honoring trade secret claims, even where there is
clear statutory authority or even a mandate to disclose.' 72 While the
federal courts have been relatively resistant to expanding trade secrecy
privileges in the past decade, agencies continue to favor secrecy over
disclosure. Part of the explanation for this is the Reagan and Bush
Administrations' program of encouraging the "information economy" by
expanding private rights to information-including information produced
by the government. 173 This approach is based largely on property principles
and it misses the fine points of information economics, such as the limits
on what the market can produce and the costs of maintaining technical
information. 74 Unions and proponents of access have not pressed the
confidentiality issue, perhaps because their resources have been taxed
defending more basic claims put into question by the new policies.
Another influence may be the fact that agencies, legislatures, and unions
are outsiders to the trade secret situation and are therefore subject to
the Pandora's Box effect, which counsels the decisionmaker not to pull
on a thread which may unravel the fabric. OSHA's final notice echoed
the industry refrain that a secret must be closely guarded because once
lost, it can never be recaptured. The agency speculated that the consequences of such a loss might be that many jobs would be affected and

168. The statute states, "In any case in which the identity of a toxic chemical is claimed as a
trade secret, the Administrator shall identify adverse health and environmental effects associated
with the toxic chemical and shall assure that such information ... is provided to any person
requesting information about such toxic chemical." 42 U.S.C. § 11042(h)(2).
169. Telephone conversation with Steven Neuburg-Rinn, EPA counsel (Feb. 8, 1991).
170. See generally 52 Fed. Reg. 38,312 (1987).
171. See comments in EPA Docket 300 PQTS7, Trade Secrecy Rules Under SARA Title III, of
William H. McBeath, M.D., Executive Director of the American Public Health Association, and
Fran DuNuelle, Director of Government Relations of the American Lung Association; see also
comments of Thomas L. Kurt, M.D., of the North Central Texas Poison Center, and comments
of the Natural Resources Defense Council (Sheiman); Toxicity Testing, pp. 229, 243.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 11042(h)(2).
173. See Lyndon, supra note 106.
174. See infra section IV. For a discussion of information policies since 1980, see VINCENT MOSCO
& JANET WASKO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFORMATION (1988); Lyndon, supra note 106.
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that the workers and employers alike might be seriously damaged. This
kind of anxious expression illustrates the emotional appeal of the argument, based on fear of loss of control. In the setting of hazard
communication, widespread unravelling may have seemed a real possibility,
since the rule covered all the nation's employers. What if one worker
in each firm, in each industry, defected to a rival with valuable secrets?
Better to let the firms keep the lid on the box. The economic evidence
reviewed in section I suggests, however, that such a disaster is unlikely.
The Costs of Secrecy
The current OSHA and EPA disclosure arrangement essentially attempts
to control access to data so that "free riders" cannot dilute its commercial
value, while allowing those who can show that they need the data for
specific noncommercial reasons to use it for diagnosis or research. Unfortunately, this compromise is far from satisfactory, if it is workable
at all. Secrecy of chemical identities imposes a variety of costs on all
participants in regulation and has impacts outside the ambit of toxics
regulation. Some of the problems with EPA's and OSHA's compromise
stem from the basic incompatibility between secrecy rules and disclosure
rules. Other difficulties result from the fact that the common law moorings
of trade secrecy are essential to its function.
In the common law context, a trade secrecy claim alleges misbehavior
by the defendant, that is, illegitimate acquisition of information. The
basic trade secret defenses revolve around the actual availability of the
information, its value in the industry, and notice of intent to maintain
secrecy. Transplanted from its roots, trade secrecy becomes a different
creature altogether. For instance, the litigation process is transformed.
Rather than an entitlement which the plaintiff seeks to vindicate, secrecy
becomes a defense to regulation; information is presumptively secret rather
than available; as a practical matter, the burden of going forward and
the burden of persuasion are shifted; and there are no commercial rivals
present to provide evidence on the key issues of the information's availability and its value in the trade.
In regulation, trade secrecy becomes a broad abstraction, a "rule"
which applies to cases which are not in court. The common law discipline
of particular fact finding and the flexibility of equitable balancing are
not available. Regulators are trying to decide for all products as a generic
category, for all values of the information, and for all symptoms of
exposure. Some issues come up which would be theoretical in the common
law context; for example, if a secret can be reverse engineered, but no
one actually does it, how should the law treat it? These differences were
not noticed in the incremental transition of common law trade secrecy
into modern disclosure laws, but they result in a series of practical and
legal problems.
For a worker or neighbor seeking data from a company, trade secret
information is, as a practical matter, simply unavailable.' There is no
B.

175. OSHA's trade secrecy rules present an example of legal centralism noted by Coase and
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incentive for an employer to disclose. 7 6 If the secret may be at all
valuable, a firm will do best to make general statements and wait to see
if the seeker can follow through on the request for the data. The regulatory
road to disclosure is arduous. The administrative process is cumbersome
and has greater procedural burdens than parallel common law litigation.
OSHA's rules require a showing of medical need for the information,
proof of adequate means to keep the data confidential, and sometimes
the posting of a bond. Moreover, in the usual common law case, both
parties are in the industry and are likely to have relevant evidence,
whereas in environmental regulation, the petitioner is an outsider. How
can an outsider show that the information is not actually secret or is
without competitive value?' 77 The agency can go through the motions of
reviewing claims, relying on symbols of value that courts rely upon, but
there is no good source of contrary information in the agency forum.
The common law of trade secrecy was designed to operate in the particular
forum of conflict between market rivals. In the administrative setting,
even if rivals were present, their interests are not those of the agency
or worker, as regulation tends to promote solidarity within an industry.
Current rules thus effectively give firms a full trade secret exemption.
The agency whose mandate is to foster health protection ends up in the
anomalous position of "sanitizing" and protecting industry documents,
editing chemical identities and health information out of disclosure systems, and thinking up ways of describing health effects so that no one
will figure out what they are. Health regulators are put in the position
of deciding matters about which they have little expertise-whether a
chemical is a trade secret and what its commercial value is. A regressive
circularity is injected into toxics regulation, because if it is not revealed,
a chemical will not be studied and therefore will not be found toxic.
Trade secret claimants themselves are not well protected by current
rules. While they are in a stronger procedural posture under OSHA's
rules than under the NTI system, any reporting requirement increases
the risk of disclosure to rivals. Firms are under pressure from the common

Ellickson. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against Coasianism, 99 YALE L.J.
611, 613 n.17 (1989). Ellickson points out that "a rational actor, peering unconfidently through
the fog that separates ordinary people from legal rules and institutions, will ignore how the legal
system sets entitlements when he calculates that his expected costs of learning and enforcing his
legal entitlements would exceed the expected value of those entitlements to him." Id. at 613. Nelkin
and Brown report that management policies on controlling information include express and implicit
threats which prevent workers from making use of the entitlements to hazard information; those
who pursue inquiries may be labelled troublemakers. See DOROTHY NELKIN & MICHAEL S. BROWN,
WORKERS AT RIsK 158-62 (1984).
176. See generally Susan D. Carle, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives to
Suppress Under OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard, 97 YALE L.J. 581 (1988). No one is
paying for the information in the hazard communication system. Viscusi says that cheap information
must be favorable. Schwartz and Wilde suggest that government should intervene to provide certain
information itself or to promote third party provision of it, rather than relying on the product
source to do so. With this theory, a manufacturer should provide only the chemical identity
information and the government should sponsor third party research. Id.; Lyndon, supra note 106.
177. It may be cheaper for a firm to create trappings of trade secrecy to impress an agency
reviewer than to risk toxicity studies.
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law to demand strict confidentiality agreements; but they must be concerned that, aside from the in terrorem effect of signing an agreement,
workers, local residents, or researchers who are let in on a secret will
have little incentive to guard it closely. Rather, they will need to communicate it in the course of pursuing their own interests. If a secret is
then somehow revealed to rivals, the odds of financial recovery are low,
as worker and researcher defendants will not have deep pockets or be
well insured. Enforcement of confidentiality agreements will be difficult,
because courts are likely to sympathize with the defendant in this context.
Indeed, a host of difficult fairness issues are implicit in these agreements.
Confidentiality requirements mean that exposed persons and researchers
will not be able to confer freely with others about potential health
problems. This raises a number of rights problems and ethical dilemmas.
For instance, the rule discourages medical consultation. It also undermines
the hazard communication system because it prevents people from checking
a firm's hazard assessment; thus, it will not be reviewed or referenced
to ongoing research, although it may be incorrect or become stale.
Comparison between symptoms and exposures, starting from the informed
hunch of the individual clinician, is the fuel of the discipline of epidemiology.17 The research agenda may be skewed by its reliance on
partial exposure data. Distortions in signals may become accepted and
not questioned, as omitted items are frozen out of the information
exchange process. 179
Limits on peer review are particularly troubling in the setting of strong
commercial disincentives to discovering and communicating toxicity. A
trade secret exemption is an option of invisibility and allows a firm to
do a minimal study and be off the hook. Chemicals may never reach
standard setting phase, because of the inadequacy of health data.
Feedback from the health sciences should guide investment in technologies. The weakness of private incentives to research toxicity, combined
with secretive behavior, may lower the general level of safety in the
industry.'8 0 Indeed, the expectation of a legal shield from health research
may affirmatively guide investments in the direction of secrecy. Steven
Cheung has suggested that such an effect exists generally in R&D investment markets. While it is difficult to tell whether these costs may
be occasional or routine, proprietary interest and interest in avoiding
regulation may combine to produce pockets of costs that are not readily
apparent, even to regulators. The actual number of trade secrets claimed
need not be large for the opportunity costs of trade secrecy to be
public project of choosing
significant.18 ' The direction and cost of the
82
and guiding technology may be affected.

178. See Lyndon, supra note 106; NATIONAL
REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 33
179.
180.
quality
181.

ACADEMY

OF SCIENCES,

DECISION

MAKING

FOR

(1975).

Spence, supra note 5.
See Akerlof, supra note 5 (discussing implications of buyers' limited ability to judge the
of products of varying grades); see also Lyndon, supra note 106.
Figures on the number of trade secrets claimed vary widely. A 1975 NIOSH survey of
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Outside the context of toxics regulation, there are other opportunity
costs related to concerns about respecting proprietary interests in information. Secrecy hampers efforts to predict the side effects of emerging
technologies and to guide incumbent technologies in new directions. Also,
the use of market-based incentives in health, safety, and environmental
regulation is compromised by legal protection for secrecy.
Environmental regulation has been largely ex post facto, but as we
gain experience with patterns in technological evolution, the value of

anticipating the effects of new technologies becomes apparent. The early
phase of each major technology has been characterized both by great
optimism and by difficulty in foreseeing its costly side effects. This cycle
may be recurring with biotechnology.
Innovation in biotechnology is influenced by a variety of factors, 8 3
but industry proponents have been successful in arguing that the "fledgling" technology should be left largely unregulated, at least for the time
being. Instead of being the subject of direct and focused regulatory
attention, the varied uses of bioengineering are covered by existing provisions in numerous federal statutes, administered by a handful of agen-

cies.1 14 There is widespread agreement that there is not enough data
available today to assess the impacts of releases of bioengineered organisms
on the environment.8 5 The rules concerning disclosure are inconsistent
because of the variety of statutes and agencies which cover biotechnology.8 6 The development of a coherent anticipatory research program will
be affected by secrecy and disclosure dynamics in this field.

exposures in the workplace found that out of 85,000 trade name products included in the study,
5,760 of these had ingredients considered trade secrets by respondents; out of 427 products considered
carcinogens, 151 were claimed trade secrets. Only 50 trade secret claims were made in the EPCRA
NTI inventory of 70,000 air emissions. Richard Grawey, in Toxic Substances and Trade Secrets,
Report of the Technical Information Project of the Ethical and Value Implications of Science and
Technology Program of the National Science Foundation 76-82 (1977); telephone conversation with
Gerard Brown, Chief of Nonconfidential Information Service Section, EPA Office of Toxic Substances
(Jan. 24, 1989). The discrepancy in the figures may be due to the focus on products in the first
survey and on pollution in the second. Alternatively, the discrepancy may be due to the different
procedural context-informal ex ante survey as opposed to legally mandated reporting to an agency
with substantiation required.
182. To the extent that agencies respect confidentiality claims, they must conduct the public's
business in secret; however, to the extent that firms do not expect their confidentiality interests to
be respected, they will not be forthcoming with the government. See Kitch, supra note 36, at 695.
183. Adler identifies a range of factors influencing growth in the biotechnology industry. See
Reid Adler, Biotechnology Development and Transfer: Recommendations for an Integrated Policy,
11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 469 (1985).
184. See Sydney A. Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation, 17 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1,
15-26 (1990).
185. The available data are inadequate to allow assessment of the dangers of many products.
For procedural problems in gaining access to such data, see Jane Rissler & Margaret Mellon, Public

Access to Biotechnology Applications, 4

NAT.

RESOURCES

&

ENV'T.

29 (1991). For examples of

conflicting risk estimates, see Shapiro, supra note 184, at 11-12. Shapiro describes different views
on the hazards of release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment. Id. Unfinished
Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems, U.S. EPA (Feb. 1987), repeatedly
points to lack of information as a difficulty in evaluating appropriate regulatory action. Volume
1, at 34 (biotechnology), 35, 38, discusses the risks of chemical exposures. Exposure data is especially
weak. Id. at 35, 38, 57, 87, 98.
186. Shapiro, supra note 184.
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Claims to secrecy also block attempts to redirect technologies which
have rigidified in dysfunctional patterns. End-of-pipe approaches to pollution control are environmentally inferior to more basic redesign of
production systems. Waste reduction, or dematerialization, favors industrial technologies which utilize fewer extracted materials, create less
waste, and facilitate recycling. Waste reduction can be accomplished in
part by finding substitutes for certain broad classes of widely used
materials. 8 7 In order to prevent waste creation by substituting products
and processes, key industries must also re-engineer some of their operations. 8 8 Waste reduction advocates argue that, in doing so, firms can
with and
increase their competitiveness, decrease the costs of complying
189
enforcing environmental regulations, and lower health risks.
There are a number of policy options available to encourage dematerialization, including a variety of information-based approaches. 9 Several bills now in Congress would establish design institutes and federal
agencies could develop rating systems.1 9' A 1986 report of the Office of
Technology Assessment ("OTA") suggests that information transfer is a
central function of any program to assist in waste reduction, 92 and the
EPA has plans to establish an information clearinghouse that could
produce and transfer information about product design changes and
chemical substitutes across products and industries. 93 These projects are
likely to be inhibited by concern that they must not violate proprietary
information claims. Industry is likely to object to close scrutiny of
processes, inputs, and product design. The OTA has recommended procedures for waste reduction at the plant level and believes that these
94
could be handled so as to avoid revealing firms' proprietary information;
however, even if this were the case, it would not solve the problem. A
proprietary design or process that does reduce waste is also likely to
lower manufacturing costs. Information that reduces costs, including
pollution costs, will have proprietary value for that reason alone. Market

187. Jesse H. Ausubel et al., Technology and Environment: An Overview, in TECHNOLOGY AND
11-12 (Jesse H. Ausubel & Hady E. Sladovitch eds., 1989).
188. Kirsten U. Oldenburg & Joel S. Hirshorn, Waste Reduction: A New Strategy To Avoid
Pollution, ENV'T., Mar. 1987, at 16-45. Companies are now organized to treat pollution and
production as entirely separate matters. Id. In addition, firms often lack basic information about
their waste streams; they commonly do not charge waste-management costs to individual production
lines. Waste management requires the participation of all phases of production, not just environmental
engineers. Id. at 42.
189. Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation, 9 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1985); Nicholas A. Ashford & George R. Heaton, Jr., Regulation and
Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer
1983).
190. Howard Levenson, Wasting Away: Policies to Reduce Trash Toxicity and Quantity, ENV'T.,
Mar. 1992, at 32. These include establishing clear goals; providing incentives with grants or preferred
status for government procurement; improving the flow of information through labelling, education,
and clearinghouse services; establishing a system of waste audits; and banning or placing fees on
specific products or substances. Id.
191. Id. at 11.
192. See Oldenburg et al., supra note 188, at 40-42.
193. Levenson, supra note 189, at 34-35.
194. Oldenburg et al., supra note 188, at 39.
ENVIRONMENT
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incentives will discourage sharing of environmental information that would
be useful to rivals. 95
This suggests a third type of dysfunction inherent in the legal option
to keep environmentally useful information secret. Advocates of the use
of property rights in pollution control point out that entitlements to
pollute should create incentives to increase the exchange value of the
rights through decreasing the owner's consumption of them.1 96 Marketable
permits to pollute will also increase incentives to keep secret any techniques
that reduce pollution, where rivals may benefit. Given the social value
of diffusion of information that reduces environmental and medical externalities, should the law support a polluter's entitlement to keep it
secret? What effects might an option of secrecy have on the development
of pollution control technology and the emerging system of environmental
auditing requirements?
The economic case for protecting secrecy of health and environmental
information is weakened when the opportunity costs are considered.
Indeed, there is a strong case for abandoning any effort to protect secrecy
in this context. This analysis has not subjected the trade secrecy claim
to the tests of jurisprudence. What might legal theorists contribute to a
resolution of the conflicting claims to this data?
III.

TRADE SECRECY AS AN ENTITLEMENT

Academic commentary on intellectual property law has tended to give
short shrift to trade secrecy. 197 When it has been addressed, approaches
have varied widely. For instance, Richard Posner sees trade secret law
not as property, but as a branch of unfair competition. He also likens
it to privacy law, calling it "corporate privacy." He sees it as providing
incentives to invest in information production and reducing the need to

195. Levenson, supra note 190, at 13.
196. See, e.g., Richard Stewart & Bruce Ackerman, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985).
197. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. PoLIcY 108 (1990). Hughes includes trade secrets in his analysis. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo L.J. 287 (1988). Like many writers commenting on intellectual
property, however, he does not fully recognize the idiosyncracies of trade secrets which distinguish
them from other entitlements to knowledge. He finds intellectual property more egalitarian than
other property, because its limited scope and duration prevent accumulation. Id. at 291. He suggests
that the greatest difference between intellectual property and other entitlements is their built-in
expiration. He treats trade secrets as simply expiring at some point when guard is let down, but
this fails to account for the effects of the period of secrecy itself, which actually may be quite
extended. Similarly, he argues that protectable ideas are unique, but trade secrets need not be. Id.
at 322. Also, intellectual property is in the public domain; he says that one can not imagine an
intellectual property system that completely excludes other uses. Id. at 317. While patents fit this
description, trade secrets do not. Indeed, trade secrecy aims to do just that. The jurisprudence of
secrecy therefore must be fundamentally different from that of the mainstream of intellectual property.
Hughes' point is important to the theory of secrecy, however. Access is the fundamental value
which limits entitlements to intellectual property and it should inform the law's treatment of secrets.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

guard against theft of information.19 Kim Scheppele agrees that trade
secrecy is like privacy, but argues that courts should protect investment
instrumentally, in order to support the relationship between the parties.1 99
Edmund Kitch suggests that the emphasis on the relationship of trust
between managers and other firm employees in trade secret law is designed
to preserve the institutional integrity of the firm and allow an accounting
of information stock. 2°° Steven Cheung maintains that property rights
cannot be articulated without destroying the secret and therefore finds
the law of contracts central here, since research in progress relies on
201 Other writers
enforcement of confidential relationships through contract.
20 2
approaches.
attempt an integration of the different
The notion of secrecy as a property entitlement is not well developed
in the theoretical literature. However, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the
Supreme Court characterized trade secrecy as an interest in the nature
of property, to the extent that state common law so holds. 20 3 The decision
was regarded by some as a turning point in trade secret law, an endorsement of the claim that trade secrets, even in the regulatory context,
are "property" in the strong sense of the term. 20 4 If the law calls an
entitlement "property," it receives greater deference in practice than do
other entitlements. 20 5 The EPA's interpretation of EPCRA's disclosure
requirements is a case in point. In Ruckelshaus, however, the Court did
not actually examine whether state common law generally does protect
secrecy of health, safety and environmental information, and its analysis

198. See POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 241; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

OF LAW, supra note 2, at 40-41; Friedman et at., supra note 2. Where information is not the result
of a significant investment, Posner finds the case for protection weakened. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 242-44. Anthony Kronman has argued that in contract cases, courts
distinguish between information acquired as a result of effort and that acquired casually, and that
courts do not look at the particular information, but the type, as it would be costly for courts to
evaluate the information as such. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the
Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1-33 (1978).
199. SCHEPPELE, supra note 2, at 254 (1988).

200. Kitch, supra note 36, at 701-04.
201. Cheung, supra note 52, at 47-49.
202. See e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review,
14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501 (1989) (the law operates at three levels-() presumed confidentiality
as in professional relationships, (2) agreements regarding confidentiality and (3) limits on dissemination, which are only imposed for good reason, as for value of the information in one use as
opposed to another).
203. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, aff'd, Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). If the common law would not provide trade secret protection
to health and safety information, how valid are federal statutes that purport to do so by incorporating
the common law by reference? Do trade secret provisions in state right-to-know laws change state
common law? One court says no. See New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp
606, 627 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).
204. MILGRIM, supra note 30.

205. See Waldron, supra note 30, at 313 (property gives such strong entitlements that overbroad
claims are made). Michelman finds that property in constitutional law is primarily understood as
an antidistributive principle. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments On
The Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967). As such,
it is a claim for incumbency; this in itself raises questions when the subject is a polluting technology.
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of Missouri's law, which applied in that case, was cursory. 2° 6 There was
no need to focus on the issue, because the EPA stipulated on this point.207
Exploring the theoretical arguments for regarding health and environmental data as property is hardly a straightforward project. Jeremy Paul
has provided a useful framework for understanding the shifting, even
circular, nature of property jurisprudence. 2 8 He suggests that courts use
two distinct kinds of reasoning when resolving property disputes. One
approach refers to existing social practice with respect to specific resources
and adopts this custom as the basis of property entitlements. The other
attempts to define clear entitlements which will provide a stable context
for the purchase and use of resources. The two models are mixed in
practice; indeed, they seem to behave symbiotically.
Both approaches are evident in the debate over disclosure of health
and safety data. There seems to be little intuitive basis for trade secret
protection when we focus on the fact of a chemical exposure of a human
body and the need for medical diagnosis and research. Social practice
would clearly reject secrecy when the case is put this way. The arguments
for secrecy are made in the contrasting mode: purchasers' investments
require the expectation of control of information related to the production
process, and producers are therefore justified in this expectation. The
two ways of thinking about the problem seem hopelessly opposed.
Nonetheless, it may be useful to apply the standard property tests to
this particular claim of entitlement. Property entitlements are generally
thought to serve several purposes. They protect the acquisitive faculties
which bring wealth, and they strengthen and protect the citizen independence and participation which enhance the community.3 Secrecy of
health and environmental information undermines both goals. It seems
that neither efficiency nor fairness support a property claim to exposure
information.
The most common economic arguments for trade secrecy are based
upon the reward approach to intellectual property law. For instance,
Posner and Anthony Kronman see privacy and trade secrecy based upon
appropriability and reward reasoning. 210 As we have seen, however, this

206. See Samuelson, supra note 126.
207. Id.
208. Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 94 S. CAL. LAW REv. 1393 (1991).
209. Stephen J. Massey, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541 (1984); see
also C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 741, 744-55 (1986). Property analyses tend to interweave a handful of related concepts
giving more or less emphasis to central ones, such as firm expectations, autonomy, and wealth
production. The utilitarian property rights clarify and secure expectations concerning access to
resources in order to maximize overall material welfare; a clear legal framework of entitlements
should encourage efficient development and exchange of goods. Entitlements can also be set according
to principles of fairness or justice. Some sense of individual rights to autonomy and freedom, both
from interference and to acquire goods, are part of rationales based either on utilitarian or fairness
principles.
210. See supra note 198. Kronman's description of the courts' protection for information as the
fruit of investment is based upon concern for appropriability. However, since the value of information
is not a function of the level of R&D expenditures, and since imitation may be very productive
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model does not reflect the complexities of the innovation process. Moreover, discussing privacy, Posner finds no good reason to give people
property rights in negative information about themselves. He does not
address the possibility of a conflict between the two, a situation in which
useful, but "negative" information is the result of an investment.' "
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the court found that Monsanto had "a
reasonable investment-backed expectation" that the agency would protect
the confidentiality of its health and safety studies. That expectation was
linked specifically to the provisions of FIFRA, however, and the court
suggested that absent such assurances a firm should not expect to keep
confidential data which are used for health and safety regulations.212 Is
this suggestion well founded? Can trade secrecy entitlements be defended
as insurance against encroachment on legitimate expectations? 213 Does the
law foster an expectation of freedom to create health and environmental
risks without allowing independent examination of them? 21 4 The decision
in Ruckelshaus suggests it does not, as does the rule that regulation to
215
abate a nuisance is not a taking.

and duplicative investments wasteful, the rule only works at its most general level, that is, that
courts protect "types" of information "deliberately acquired."
211. POSNER, THE EcoNoMics OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 233; see discussion of privacy and
trade secrecy, infra. In Posner's analysis, information has the capacity for only one meaning.
Scheppele points out that Chicago School microeconomics ignores the larger lesson of information
economics, that is, that the uses of information are many and pervasive throughout the economy;
thus disclosure may increase the efficiency of many decisions. SCHEPPELE, supra note 2, at 35, 165,
251-53.
Like Posner, Scheppele argues that investment is the hallmark of trade secrecy, though she sees
the function of investment differently. In her view, courts follow an essentially contractarian approach
to disputes about disclosure and are concerned to make the starting point equal for the parties, in
both individual and "corporate privacy." She suggests that in the commercial context information
is equally accessible to the two parties in the dispute, as the costs of making technological advances
are likely to be roughly equal for different firms. Thus, courts look to the plaintiff's investment
as evidence that the other could also invest. If no investment is made, she says, then the knowledge
must be obvious and therefore not a secret. Id. at 260.
Courts do say this sometimes, but it is a fallacy based on hindsight. Nelson and Winter point
out that we often think of knowledge as abstract, picked out of the air, but by definition firms
do start in different places and have different costs. Also, unlike the patent system, trade secrecy
does not make obviousness a test for recovery; obviousness has little meaning in the topographical
model. Investment is relevant, but courts generally consider it at the remedy stage, not as an element
of the cause of action. This makes sense, since the law intends to encourage investment, but the
value of information and the level of investment may be only loosely related. If investment were
the primary criterion for protection, the law would encourage everyone to invest in signalling
investments, causing waste in addition to common pool duplication. So the law makes this deal:
if you produce scarce data of any value, at whatever cost, you can keep it secret if you make a
credible effort to do so.
212. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1010 (1984).
213. See STEPHEN R. MtNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 79-80 (1990); Michelman, supra note
102; Duncan Kennedy & Frank I. Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711, 712-26 (1980) (pointing out that one person's certainty may be another's uncertainty).
214. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984). Utilitarian property theory, though it
emphasizes security of expectations, holds that compensation need not be paid for takings when
an investment was made which interrupted someone else's enjoyment of a good, where this should
have been apparent, or where society has adequately made it known that the investment should
not be the object of expectations of continuing enjoyment. Michelman, supra note 106, at 1241.
215. See Paul, supra note 208; Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue is
Still A Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 582 (1984). Richard A. Epstein, Takings: PrivateProperty
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Broader efficiency arguments for trade secrecy are also problematic.
Property rights theorists would allocate entitlements based on measures

of economic productivity, starting from the hypothesis that control over
21 6

scarce resources is necessary to identify and achieve their best use.
Secretive behavior, however, does not prevent misuse or overconsumption
of information; rather, it seems to compound inefficiencies, and secrecy
about externalities seems by definition to be overconsumption. Legal
protection for secretive behavior may be justified, as Posner suggests,
by a showing that it actually reduces such behavior. However, this
argument, which is both appealing and counter-intuitive, falls short of
being a convincing general rationale for trade secret law. 217 In any event,
it does not apply to specific protections for exposure data. There is no
reason to expect that a trade secret exemption to disclosure rules will
lead firms to reveal more data than the rule already requires.
Harold Demsetz suggests that property rights emerge from new forms
of specialization and that they survive to the extent they assist in internalizing new technologies' externalities. In this view, the long-term viability
of new property rights depends on how well they influence behavior to

accommodate to the externalities associated with important changes in
technology or market values. 21 Demsetz's approach gives property rules
a role in integrating new technologies with social practice, but it also
takes technologies as given, externalities and all. Property rights themselves
influence the innovation process and the investment choices which channel
technical options into specific externality patterns. The question for law-

and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985) [as per Thomas W. Merrill review at 80 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1561, 1573 (1986)] suggests that where economic theory tells us that there is a common pool
or collective action problem, legislation to overcome the problem should be read as providing implicit
compensation. MUNZER, infra note 213, ch. 15. Nuisance regulation is not a taking. See Michelman,
supra note 106, at 1196-1201, 1236 (expressing reservations: the rule has strong intuitive appeal,
but harm-prevention and benefit-extraction distinctions in takings have limited analytical adequacy
if the balancing is grounded in efficiency considerations).
216. Property rights arguments start from resource scarcity, but this is problematic when applied
to knowledge. Knowledge is not unlimited, as some suggest. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 197.
Knowledge in the abstract seems not to be limited by the possibility of exhaustion, but the extent
or content of actual knowledge may be limited by human nature, by cultural framework, or by
topographical context. Kitch points out that the resources available to produce information are
limited. Yet, limits on the investment of resources and limits on the possible knowledge product
itself are distinct; secrecy limits both.
217. See discussion, supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
218. Property rights should guide incentives to achieve greater internalization of externalities.
Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS
347, 348-52 (1967). Perhaps the very concept of an externality becomes overbroad when applied to
something as fluid as information, but Demsetz applies his model to informational externalities.
Id. at 359. If we define an externality as something which cannot be the subject of a transaction
(cannot be internalized in the market process) or as a harm or benefit to third parties whose costs
to transact concerning the effect are greater than the gains from internalization, secrecy entitlements
to pollution data do not internalize. Trade secret entitlements in general are weak protection against
"free riders" and compound the costs of negative externalities when the secret concerns an exposure.
The "owner" has no incentive to disclose to someone who is not a potential licensee, who would
also keep it secret. Coordination costs, free riders, and lack of funds prevent purchase by the
exposed and by researchers. Further, secrecy will pose a threshold barrier to demand where the
fact of the exposure or its link to an injury is not readily apparent.
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makers is who shall accommodate whom? 219 A technology built on costly
externalities will surely
claim new entitlements, but these may still be
220

wasteful or unfair.

Are the fairness arguments for trade secrecy of environmental data
stronger than its efficiency claims? While one is entitled to the fruits of
one's labors, one is not entitled to injure others with them. 221 In any
event, knowledge, even more than other "fruits," results from cooperative
enterprise; indeed, much of the science underlying some of today's technologies has been funded by public monies. 222 Individuals' or firms' claims

to deserve exclusive control over these for their own benefit may be
excessive. 223 Wendy Gordon has pointed out that the "free rider" or
unjust enrichment basis for granting an entitlement to intangibles tends
to expand beyond the economic and moral boundaries which seem jus224
tified.
First possession is also a weak basis for secrecy claims. 225 Two interests
may be posited as the subject possession-the exposure information or

219. Id. at 350. Demsetz illustrates his discussion with examples from Native American history;
Carol Rose uses frontier homesteaders. More complex subject matter reveals important factors at
play. See Paul, supra note 208, at 1423-25; William H. Riker & Itai Sened, A Political Theory of
the Origin of Property Rights: Airport Slots (Nov. 1990) (unpublished paper presented at Columbia
University Legal Theory Workshop; on file with the New Mexico Law Review). Demsetz' model
does not address the political dimension, but this results in a treatment that is ahistorical and
abstract. It also allows for extrapolations that would not be justified from richer descriptions. See
Gregory S. Alexander, History vs. Ideology in the Basic Property Course, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381
(1986). The problem and literature related to it are discussed in GARY D. LIBEcAP, CONTRACTING
FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16-69 (1989).
220. One can view the history of applied chemistry as an illustration of a dynamic of expanding
legal claims to resources. The growth of the chemical industry in the period following World War
It took place in a virtual air and water commons and, at least initially, low pressure on land
resources. Industry invested in plants designed to use these resources and implicitly made claims to
the use of air, water, soil, plants, and human and animal bodies for waste disposal. These claims
have the presumption of validity under current statutes, because OSHA and EPA must find that
exposure causes environmental harm or health risks before it must be curtailed. Widespread use of
chemicals spurred related study: epidemiology, toxicology, and the new technologies of chemical
measurement extended the territory in contention by revealing the pervasiveness of chemical dispersion.
Computers and electronic communications, which increase the capacity to use information, developed
in the same period. State right-to-know laws then codified the claims of those exposed and, in
response, trade secret claims were expanded to the identity of exposure in OSHA's hazard communication rulemaking and to health effects data in the EPA's NTI proceeding. Right-to-know and
notice laws continue to expand and, in turn, broader privilege claims are being made.
221. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 29-35 (1974) (discussing Locke, moral constraints, aggression, and the Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not means); BOK, supra
note 2, at 142-44, 148-50 (on Locke's proviso that one must leave "enough and as good" for
others); Rose, supra note 213. See generally WElL & SNAPPER, supra note 53.
222. This is most clearly the case with biotechnology. See Nelkin & Brown, supra note 175, at
24-25 (discussing private research dollars yielding considerable profits when applied to basic knowledge
developed at public expense).
223. Munzer discusses work as a social enterprise and examines the limits this places on claims
for property. MUNZER, supra note 213, at 280.
224. Wendy Gordon, On Owning Information:Intellectual Property and the RestitutionaryImpulse,
78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992).
225. Richard Epstein advocates first possession as a basis because he finds that it is intuitively
right, simple, and efficient in the sense that it gets the property system going. But he also recognizes
the roles of adverse possession and notice, which prevent waste and accommodate the need to
protect strangers to the title. Richard. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the
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to control exposure data extinguishes
the body which is exposed. A claim
226
the claim to control the body.

Personal autonomy is an elemental legal concept which logically precedes
arguments for entitlements, though its definition and scope are debated. 27
The simple fact of exposure to pollutants, absent any secrecy, raises
difficult autonomy problems. It seems that under any conception of
autonomy, withholding information about potentially harmful exposures
would be invalid. The opportunity to know about exposures is central
to choices about survival. Consent to bear the risks of an exposure is
distinct from consent to prevent oneself or others from ameliorating its
effects. Secrecy imposes helplessness on the exposed person. Legalizing
secret exposures also immunizes the polluter from liability. Legal protection of secret exposures is neither fair nor efficient,228 but rather a form
of "total risk bearing," in Dean Calabresi's words.
Even if secrecy of exposures cannot be defended based on these standard
tests, it might still be chosen as the preferable rule if it were seen as
generally more productive than disclosure. One could try to compute the
value of the two alternative entitlement schemes. Unfortunately, computing
expected values, which is problematic in any case, is so complicated here
that it is a very weak decision guide. The limited implications that can
be drawn from it support disclosure rather than secrecy.
Measuring and balancing information entitlements in this context entails
several basic problems. The familiar equity issues associated with costbenefit analysis are exacerbated in the environmental context. 229 As a

Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 667-68 (1986). Carol Rose points out that the two
principles of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805), are notice to the world and reward. Acts
of appropriation are signalling devices, which have meaning only in the context of a recognizing
community. When the law recognizes a claim, it puts its imprimatur on that meaning and those
who do not recognize it are out of luck. Secrecy prevents these essential processes from occurring.
226. See Patricia Williams, Fetal Fictions:An Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and
Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81 (1990). The claim of entitlement to be free from liability,
in spite of causing an exposure, is a property claim to the body of the one exposed. Id. See Paul,
supra note 208, at 1418-23, on the conundrums of "physicalist" property arguments, which must
select which social practice to adopt when two customs or view of resource use conflict.
227. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 1849 (1987); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STANFORD L. REV. 957 (1982). Property may be justified
as a means to control over one's body a right to basic nourishment and the means to develop the
human personality. Id. The economist's self-interested, utility maximizing actor also works from a
base of informed autonomy, necessary to participate in the market. Cf. Jules L. Coleman & Jody
Kraus, Rethinking The Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986); see ScIEPPELE, supra
note 2, at 60-66 (on consent as a basis for legal morality).
228. Guido Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEx. L. RaV. 519, 525 (1978).
Secrecy creates a feeling of exclusion. Here, it also fosters a sense of helplessness in the face of
an injury, compounded by a sense of waste, since someone knows something that might help, and
of anger, as someone is profiting while the exposed is in peril. This is not imagined, especially in
the worker's case; the information asymmetry is compounded by an economic and power asymmetry.
Autonomy can give way to distortion, disfigurement, and destruction of the person. Id.; see Williams,
supra note 226 (citing data on large numbers of Brazilian women having themselves sterilized to
keep jobs which entail chemical risks).
229. See Michael S. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An inadequate Basis for Health, Safety and
Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions:
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practical matter, the basic data necessary to do an analysis frequently
do not exist. Even where basic data are available, measuring and comparing the future values of different types of knowledge is a very uncertain
exercise. Cost-benefit analysis assumes that one can identify and price
all of the relevant costs and benefits to be weighed and predict these
values over time. For instance, the context of future usage must be
understood and surrogate prices must be developed, as there are no
established market prices. 230 Estimating the costs of environmental injuries,
particularly those with long term latencies, is difficult, 23' and identifying
and valuing technological innovation is no easier. 23 2 Figuring out the costs
of the research necessary to identify the injuries and achieve the inno-

vations is even more uncertain. Balancing the two is a meaningless exercise.
There is a more fundamental problem. Cost-benefit analysis is designed
to assist selection between alternative projected outcomes. It uses a probabilistic approach to structuring the situation, which may solve some of
the uncertainty problems posed by the decision; 233 however, it does not
solve a crucial difficulty present here. The subjective assessment inherent
in probabilistic extrapolations is limited by present knowledge. 23 4 Future
knowledge cannot be predicted based on extrapolation from what we
know now without ignoring some basic dynamics of learning, including

Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979); William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and EnvironmentalDecisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 191 (1980) (analysis of the specific issues in the environmental context).
230. Dasgupta notes that the environmental impact of current production and consumption activities
take place in the future; without an adequate set of forward-looking risk data, recourse to direct
curtailment of certain types of consumption and limiting the use of some production processes may
be necessary. PARTHA DASGUPTA, THE CONTROL OF RESOURCES 11 (1982).

231. Harvey Brooks, The Typology of Surprises in Technology, Institutions, and Development,
in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BIOsPHERE, 331-32, 335-39 (1986); FREDERICK R. ANDERSON
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY, 43-44, 593-603, 869-71 (1990); Rodgers,
supra note 229. Anderson, Mandelker, and Tarlock discuss the difficulties of making an inventory
of all relevant costs and benefits and the resulting temptation to exclude "remote" effects. ANDERSON
ET. At, supra, at 597. In addition, they discuss, the selection of an appropriate discount rate.
Relatively high discount rates (around 10%) are applied to the potential costs of leaving hazardous
chemicals unregulated. Id. at 599-600. Injuries may not be realized for many years. The National
Academy of Science has pointed out that, if the discount rate were 5%, one toxic poisoning case
in 1975 would be valued the same as 1,733 cases in 200 years, or the same as the world population
in 450 years. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN
THE ENVIRONMENT 43 (1975). Discounting future injuries allows an increase in present actual welfare.
Future injuries are uncertain, but how can the living strike an appropriate bargain with future
generations? Id. (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284 (1970)).
232. George Priest suggests that it is not possible for economists to answer basic questions about
the value of commercial innovation. Economists can tell whether a rule will lead to more or less
innovation, but the social value of that innovation is not susceptible to measurement. Priest, supra
note 72.
233. Robert W. Kates, Success, Strain, and Surprise, in 2 ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 46
(1985).
234. Mario J. Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) (citing generally, in note 58, G.L.S. SHACKLE, DECISION, ORDER, AND
TIME IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 47-113 (1961), for proposition that the application of probabilistic methods
assumes that all of the possibilities are known beforehand). Rizzo states that, "Technological change
...essentially involves unknown possibilities. Novel ideas or genuine surprises are not possibilities
over which a probability distribution can be drawn: the sample space is incomplete and incompletable."
Id. at 308.
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the possibility of surprise. 235 Assigning a value to present knowledge and
then awarding a secrecy entitlement to it closes off opportunities to learn
about the technology's effects. Thus, one is not simply discounting known
risks, but also agreeing to ignore unknown risks. To allow secrecy as a
support for appropriability is to accept the product without the opportunity to study its effects. It seems clear that the opportunity to examine
risks and externalities is a significant value. Innovation stripped of knowledge about its side effects will have higher overall costs than innovation
accompanied by learning about it.
Calabresi's and A. Douglas Melamed's framework accommodates both
property and liability considerations in a model that fits the topographical
notion of learning. They recommend property rules where there is sufficient information to allocate resources to the most productive use and,
where there is uncertainty, a series of steps for assigning liability to the
cheapest briber, the party positioned to make the best of existing information. 23 6 Similarly, Kitch explains patents as essentially placing a
property entitlement in the hands of the cheapest learner. 23 7 The patent
gives control of the research prospect to the one who has proven her
ability to learn; at the same time, it issues notice to other interested
parties who also have expertise, so they are in a position to deal. This
is the basic principle on which the law should build.
Unfortunately, no single firm or individual is well situated to develop
23
both technological knowledge and a full understanding of its effects.
If we had to choose one, the "best" learner might still be the manufacturer, since the polluter does have a good part of the relevant information and commercial enterprises generate financial resources which
can be applied to research. Firms could also avoid pollution costs by
reducing or eliminating exposures. The problem is that the trade secret
holder is somewhat disabled when it comes to studying the effects of a
technology. A producing firm is not especially well situated to gather
dispersed epidemiological and ecological data or to criticize its own

235. The term "surprise" is used in two senses. Information theorists use it as a measure of the
information content of a message, defined in terms how much "news" it brings. Shannon & Weaver,
The Mathematical Theory of Communication (1949), described by W. KINGSTON, INNOVATION,
CREATIVITY AND LAW 106 (1990). Brooks, supra note 231, at 326-32, uses it in the sense of new
connections becoming apparent as we explore terrain. We know some of what is there, but are
limited by our position.
236. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1972); see Ellickson, supra note 175,
at 722-24.
237. Kitch, supra note 40.
238. The assumption of the property rights school that individual, centralized control over resources
will maximize resource use is not correct with knowledge. Kitch suggests that the best use of
resources can be made by the individual, because of transaction costs, but where there are externalities
that require the attention of separate scientific disciplines, the firm is not in the best position to
address them. Kitch's analogy to mining explains patent law well, but he does not integrate FOIA
and restrictive covenant rules because he does not recognize the multiple meanings of information.
Knowledge is more flexible than minerals. Technical knowledge has positive externalities for neighboring industries and for disciplines outside the market of the inventor.
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production processes. 2 9 Data must be shared if we are to produce the
complex knowledge we need.
The arguments for treating trade secrets as property are unsatisfying
because they are poorly adapted to the subject matter, which is withholding
information in conditions of uncertainty about third party injuries. It is
disclosure-a form of exchange and cooperation-which is both customary
and familiar in the law. 240 The law of informed consent, particularly in
the context of medical experiments using humans, is the strongest articulation of this theme.2 4 1 Statutory information entitlements, such as rightto-know laws, have elaborated on the common law. Secrecy as a defense
to a liability claim for failure to warn and secret nuisances are contradictions in common law terms . 242 Secrecy is a form of behavior which
the liability system normally does not contemplate, except as strategic
behavior. 243 It may be a species of strategic behavior or create opportunities
for it. 2" Neither regulators nor courts are well positioned to correct these
failures .245

239. Michelman, supra note 106, at 684-85 (physical evidence is dispersed); see Howard A. Latin,
Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 187, 218 (1982).
240. Custom is the usual basis for managing a commons. BONNIE J. MCCAY & JAMEs M. ACHESON,
THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES (1987). It
presupposes a populace that behaves according to customs of civic care. Rose, supra note 213, at
745-46. Id. There is a theme in property law which maintains that commerce socializes, by modifying
the appetite for "more." Thus, property "depends on a web of respect, honor, and acceptance
that somehow modifies the immediate appetite for 'more."' Carol M. Rose, "Enough, and as
Good" of What?, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 439 (1987). Secrecy about exposures is the antithesis
of this.
241. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (in general on informed consent); Note, Informed Consent and
Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974); see FDA regulations on Protection of Human Subjects,
21 C.F.R. §§ 50 to 50.58 (1992). Section 50.25 details the elements of informed consent, including
reasonably foreseeable risks. See discussion of subjects as free agents in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES (1982), reprinted in JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW SCIENCE

903 (1984).
242. Warning and consent rules attempt to establish a connection between the parties ex ante.
Warning gives the plaintiff the option of assuming or avoiding the contact. See Sanderson v. Upjohn,
578 F. Supp. 338, 340-41 (D. Mass. 1984). The question of the identity of the danger of the
exposure rarely comes up ex post, but if the danger can only be avoided through knowing its
identity, it logically follows that, ex ante, this is a necessary part of the warning. One basic reason
for informed consent is to enable second opinions. The closest concept to the secret nuisance is
the view of false imprisonment that the imprisonment of an unconscious person is not a tort. This
presents a conundrum, as deterrence and impact seem to be ignored by this rule.
243. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Public Policy and Bob Jones University, 1983
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23-31 (1983). Freed and Polsby suggest that strategic behavior imposes two types
of costs-immediate or individual and systemic. The latter may lead to the unravelling of the
government policy sought to be avoided by the strategic behavior. Here these include the immediate
costs associated with not knowing about any particular pollution externality and the systemic cost
of undermining the regulatory project.
244. Id.; BOK, supra note 2. Secrecy which is economically legitimate may still create opportunities
for illegitimate activities. In addition to outright deception, it allows manipulation of information
and overbroad claims. STEVENSON, JR., supra note 2. Bok suggests that secrecy and the isolation
from feedback that attends it can debilitate judgment. BoK, supra note 2, at 105-11. Stevenson
analyzes "the urge for secrecy" in terms of the personal agendas of the principals in corporate
dealings. STEVENSON, JR., supra note 2, at 51. Secrecy may grow by feeding on itself, developing
AND MEDICINE

Winter 19931

SECRECY AND INNOVATION IN TORT LAW

The common law recognizes a secrecy option in the privacy area and
some scholars have linked commercial trade secrecy law to common law
liability for invasion of personal privacy. 246 The two have the same basic
structure of notice and publication. Notice of intent to keep a secret is
necessary to create the duty to keep the confidence, and publication
destroys the duty. Since pollution places the need for the information,
though not the information itself, in the public realm, it is consistent
with the logic of both areas of law to consider the discharge of pollution
to be the equivalent of a publication.
Another link between privacy and trade secret law is the perception
that both firms and individuals need to control some kinds of information
in order to interact with peers. 247 Privacy and autonomy are dependent
upon control over some types of information. As Sisella Bok stresses,
however, it is important to distinguish privacy, which is a realm subject
to protection, and secrecy, a behavior associated with guarding that realm.
It is also important to distinguish between individual and collective secrecy.3 The needs of firms and those of families, friends and acquaintances are quite different and operate in separate "economies." Firms
generally are hierarchical and competitive, with control, profit, and utility
the dominant values of the marketplace. Family and social relations are
subject to less adversarial mores. The extent of the difference between
business and social life is an interesting question, but there is no need
to see them as the same.
It is the strength of Sheppele's analysis of privacy and secrecy that it
is grounded in the social context and makes a place for discussion about
different reasons for disclosure. In her model, people would choose a
rule that requires disclosure of secrets that might cause great damage to
others. 249 Her fundamental rule is, "Disclosure is required (or, put more
straightforwardly, privacy is not allowed) when the information has been
to know in order to make decisions
judged necessary for someone'25else
0
that she is entitled to make.

into a kind of black hole of information. See Kitch, supra note 36. See also the history of secrecy
claims in toxics regulation described supra in section II and the discussion of knowledge production

in section IV.
245. Secrecy is linked in our minds with deception for good reason. As Bok expresses it, "Lies
are part of the arsenal used to guard and to invade secrecy; and secrecy allows lies to go undiscovered
and to build up."
246. See POSNER, THE EcO NOMCS OF JusTicE, supra note 2; SCHEPPELE, supra note 2.
247. BOK, supra note 2; Scheppele, supra note 2 (regarding boundaries). Secrecy involves claims
that invoke both identity and power. BOK, supra note 2; Scheppele, supra note 2, at 5. Tefft's
book contains studies of secrecy as a behavior in groups as varied as the Ku Klux Klan and the
Taos Pueblo leaders. See STANTON K. TEFFr, SECREcY-A CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1980).
248. BOK, supra note 2, at 13 n.29.
249. Id. Scheppele's discussion, like many, tends to assume that secrecy will cause damage and
not the reverse. Scheppele, supra note 2.
250. Scheppele concludes that: (1) the law should always require disclosure of secrets that would
seriously injure someone and disclosure of deep secrets, except when the stakes are small; and (2)
serial, but shared, secrets should not be disclosed unilaterally, unless secrecy would cause great
harm, on the theory that promises should be enforced. Scheppele does not try to structure a rule
normatively to encourage people to make certain decisions. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 2, at 78,
83 (discussion of autonomy as the moral basis of the law).
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If knowledge construction is a social project, this starting point makes

sense. Since each actor begins at different places and with different
materials, each makes a distinct and necessary contribution. Another way
of viewing the problem is to think of the existing stock of knowledge

as "the common of the known," ' 25' upon which new understandings and
ideas must build. We currently have a technological commons with no
access restrictions, 2 but with legal protection for secrecy, which bars
some uses of data which would help correct the negative effects of
technologies; thus, we have a commons with inappropriate access rules.
should be
Access by those concerned with the impacts of technologies
25 3
assured by establishing a basic rule of disclosure.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES

Suppose the present de facto presumption of legal priority for secrecy
interests were reversed. Assuming the desirability of a rule of disclosure
for all exposures, what would be the effect on the innovation process?
How would this rule fit with current law? Could a new approach be
tailored to accommodate both appropriability and disclosure needs?
Current disclosure rules fail to take account of the fact that secrecy

functions as a resource in a privately controlled system of information
exchange.2 4 Adding new players with outside interests, such as scientists,
workers, or neighbors dislocates the private market for data. Trade secret
disclosure invoked by individuals triggers the positional anxiety of a firm,
since disclosure may put it at a disadvantage with respect to its rivals.
Setting disclosure standards based upon exposure will affect some firms
more than others. In any event, it changes the information market and
makes it less predictable, because this disclosure is not related to commercial value. 255 In regulatory and legislative settings, proponents of trade
secrecy protection may not have been arguing for the importance of any

251. See discussion by Winter in Weil & Snapper, supra note 53, at 44.
252. Nonlegal restrictions of course include the requirement of ownership of resources to finance
research. See Mary Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Legitimacy: An Introduction
to the Symposium, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (1989).
253. Disclosure can be thought of as a limitation on alienability. Susan Rose-Ackerman has
outlined efficiency rationales for inalienability rules as second-best responses to market failures due
to externalities, imperfections in information, or difficulties in coordination. Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 938 (1985). Richard
Epstein finds that overexploitation of a common pool justifies restraints on alienation. Epstein,
supra note 225, at 667. Efficiency is served by alienation restrictions where a transaction causes
significant externalities to third parties. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 236, at 1111; SCHEPPELE,
supra note 2, at 259, 263. There are plausible efficiency and rights arguments for making access
inalienable. See Anthony Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983)
(suggesting that significant asymmetries in parties' access to information may make it efficient to
make warranties nondisclamable).
254. See STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 3150. He analyzes the dynamics of information use and
gives examples of firms' sensitivity to relinquishing information to the government in industries
where the principle mode of competition is competitive bidding. Id. at 34-35, 46-47.
255. Id. at 36-50 (concluding that increased information disclosure is not likely to decrease the
effectiveness of market competition).
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particular subjects or categories of intellectual property, but for incumbent
positions in the information market.
Firms' expectations concerning secrecy options can be changed by
changing the law. 25 6 Incentives could be shifted to encourage firms to
invest in alternative technologies or appropriability supports, instead of
the trappings of trade secrecy currently encouraged by the common law.
There appear to be three basic alternatives. These are sketched briefly
here, with many questions necessarily left for later consideration.
First, we could dispense with any secrecy protection in the exposure
context. Much of the case law and the jurisprudential analysis in section
III supports this approach, and it would be simple to administer. If the
law explicitly required disclosure of chemical identity where an exposure
occurs, each firm could choose between avoiding exposures or dealing
with the certainty of disclosure by patenting or emphasizing other nonlegal
appropriability strategies. 257 Because exposure comes late in the innovation
process, there may be little effect on the actual process of R&D itself.
In any event, R&D investments and business practices would develop
around this rule. The path of development might be channelled away
from exposures that need to be kept secret for appropriability reasons.
In addition, development of other types of information would be encouraged by removing legal protection for secrecy. Cooperative research
or even a market for health and safety studies might be encouraged, 25if
it were clear that no advantage could be gained by keeping them secret. 1
The same might occur for waste reduction techniques and pollution control
devices.
A second approach could be modeled on FIFRA. When there is a
request for disclosure of exposure or health and safety information, the
agency with jurisdiction in the substantive regulatory area could call in
the firms interested in the technology information and require an arbitration on value and terms of use. There still would be valuing problems
and opportunities for strategic behavior, but it would be better than the
current disclosure system, as it would provide whatever discipline market
rivalry might offer. The government could act as a referee, but would
not be a broker, quality control agent, or record sanitizer.

256. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 60. Nelson and Winter have modeled the innovation selection
environment, identifying the elements which influence investment decisions, including regulatory
influences on what is profitable and the interaction of business routines and innovation. Id. They
stress the fact that firms are limited in their options to change based on past experience but that
choice among the options is made according to the reward structure which the world presents. Id.
at 128-36. They identify four elements which influence investment decisions: (1) the cost-benefit
ratio of the innovation; (2) the consumer and regulatory influences on what is "profitable;" (3)
the relationship between "profit" and the expansion or contraction of particular organizations or
units; and (4) the mechanisms for learning about the successful innovations of other organizations
and the nature of the mechanisms which facilitate or deter imitation. Id. at 229, 248, 250-63.
257. Professor Dreyfuss has noted that the option of truly secret behavior is effectively reduced
or removed by regulatory supervision anyway. Conversation with Rochelle Dreyfuss, Professor, New
York University School of Law (Dec. 1, 1992).
258. Lyndon, supra note 106 (regarding encouraging market for research on toxicity).
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A third option would be to provide alternative patent protection. This
would have to be explored more fully than is possible here; the industries
involved could no doubt come up with good suggestions. With a note
of caution that new appropriability mechanisms might have unforeseen
effects, 25 9 some possibilities are outlined here.
A mini-patent or registration system could be established to support
appropriability of nonpatentable information in this category. 260 The current combination of secrecy, security measures, learning and espionage
strategies, licensing arrangements, and litigation could continue virtually
undisturbed, with a disclosure and registration mechanism replacing secrecy for the limited category of exposure data. Resources could be
shifted from investment in security symbols to enforcement of those
particular entitlements. The standards for registration might vary with
the context and could perhaps be the subject of negotiation. 26' The system
could require registrants to claim the value and life span of their work
as a basis for some period of automatic exclusive use. Rivals could
challenge the claims and the registrant might pay or negotiate for more
exclusivity provisions
favorable terms. Any violation of the new system's 262
actions.
remedial
law
common
to
subject
be
could
Disputes over claims might be a new source of litigation, but it would
not be fundamentally different in kind from current trade secret litigation.
Such a system would increase the certainty of firms' expectations and
raise the value of some information. This might encourage R&D investment based on the same reasoning that supports the patent system.
It would reduce the costs of protecting the secrets subject to it, though
other secrets,
much of the symbolic protection would still be required for
2 63
and espionage expenditures might be largely unaffected.

259. DRaEYiuss, supra note 88, at 28-30 (pointing out some of the practical difficulties inherent
in the process of fine-tuning intellectual property rules).
Fears of international competitive disadvantage are probably overdrawn, as the pattern is for
industrial nations to harmonize their rules. If the United States were to adopt a special rule for
secrecy about pollution, others would follow suit.
260. Mary L. Lyndon, The Trade Secret Exemption in Environmental and Worker Hazard
Communications Laws 54-56 (1986) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge To Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 897 (1988) (proposing an international safety net registration system for information
products). Registration systems have been used by several European countries to supplement their
patent system and are used in a variety of ways by different United States intellectual property
schemes.
The 1983 Orphan Drug Act, to foster development of drugs for rare diseases, gives exclusive use
terms of seven years. An Orphan Products Board is established at 42 U.S.C. § 236. See Andrew
Pollack, Orphan Drug Law Spurs Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1990, at DI (while law has generally
worked, it has been a bonanza for the makers of some very big drugs).
The Register of Copyrights allows computer programs to be partially withheld to protect trade
secrets. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(vii) (1988) permits the deposit of only the identifying portions of the
program.
261. This last approach would, of course, pose the problem of incumbents raising entry barriers.
This problem exists anyway; disclosure would increase diffusion, which lowers entry barriers.
262. See, e.g., C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine:
Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55 (1987).
263. Documentation of techniques in use might be a new or increased cost.
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The chief problems in designing a registration or patent system are
articulating the fit and implementing enforcement.
The subject matter and duration of coverage will depend on the system's
purpose. Current trade secret law is not specific about its goals; it is
not clear from the law what specific function trade secrecy is meant to
have in the innovation process. If trade secrets are conceived of as any
valuable information that has not been patented, an alternative registration
system with less stringent requirements than patent law may be preferable
to trade secrecy from the inventor's point of view. If trade secrecy largely
protects know-how information, it may not include much exposure information and may be largely unaffected by the new option.
In industries which already use patents heavily, a registration system
may not require much adjustment. Product patents have been found to
be most effective in drugs, pesticides, industrial organic chemicals, and
in uncomplicated mechanical equipment. Process patents were also rated
fairly highly by four chemical industries (drugs, plastic materials, inorganic
chemicals, and organic chemicals). 26 These are the industries that are
central to environmental and health concerns.
Enforcement considerations are also important. The literature, however,
suggests that firms already are very involved in observing each other.
Also, since the new system would only address pollution and health and
safety studies, the existing regulatory system would provide a useful
information context, including inventories, environmental audits, and the
health sciences. Indeed the TSCA and NTI inventories
might constitute
265
an embryonic registration and enforcement system.
There are other ways in which intellectual property law could support
health and environmental regulation. A specifically environmental appropriability support would be consistent with current trends in intellectual
property law which pay attention to the dynamics of individual industries. 26 Perhaps the most inventive synthesis is the Semiconductor Chip
Act, which combines elements of patent, copyright, and trade secrecy
law. Novelty is not required and even small advances are protected. The
Act dispenses with the examination procedure used in patent law and
adopts automatic protection, set at ten years. The registration system

264. Levin et al., supra note 86, at 795-96.
265. Nicola Atkinson & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection, 5
EUR. INTELL. PROP. R. 165 (1991) (addressing this possibility in the European system).
266. Cheung, supra note 53, at 52. Cheung suggests that any improvement in efficiency in the
protection of ideas must be in the direction of delineating more clearly and at a lower cost just
what rights are being transacted. "Given the defects of trade secrets, it seems that the more efficient
course would be the refining of criteria for drafting and enforcing patent claims so that recourse
to the trade-secret option may be reduced." Id.
See also Dreyfuss, supra note 88 (proposing a basic international system of protection for certain
kinds of intellectual property-' 'information products"). Dreyfuss suggests that the traditional allocation of roles in intellectual property-broad regimes covering all new inventions, fine tuned by
the judiciary to meet the needs of individual situations-may be shifting. The Chip Act may stand
for the proposition that current intellectual property problems cannot be solved be accretion, but
require greater attention by legislators. Dreyfuss, supra note 88, at 911 n.52; John A. Kiddwell,
Software and Semiconductors: Why Are We Confused?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 533 (1985).
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requires the deposit of a representation of each layer of the chip, but
the applicant can withhold parts of the chip information as trade secrets.
The Act also has specific provisions intended to address research and
26
experiment problems analogous to those in the biotechnology context; 1
for example, reverse engineering for teaching, analyzing, and evaluating
is not an infringement. This allows for subsequent compatible inventions.
A second type of specific adaptation is the Drug Price Competition
Act of 1984.261 The statute is an attempt to stimulate drug and medical
device innovation and diffusion, in part through the release of more
information to generic drug manufacturers. It extends patent terms of
drugs which are the subject of the lengthy FDA premarketing registration
processes, liberalizes public and competitive access to application information, including safety and efficacy data, and revises the registration
process to encourage generic drug manufacture.
An environmental patent system might be a useful supplement to current
regulation. EPA "technology forcing" strategies have been criticized as
too uncertain and short term, 269 but the full range of possibilities for
improving innovation in the environmental area has not been explored.
A specialized registration system could be crafted to encourage innovation. 270 The basic aim would be to provide an additional incentive to
develop new environmental controls.27' Such a system need not be as
generalizable as the common law and patent system are. Its administrative
costs might be low if it were designed to provide for flexible management,
or even for self-enforcement. 272 There are other options, including use
of an extension service, modeled on the agricultural extension service.
Rating systems, such as the Europeans are developing, also provide
appropriability.

2

11

267. Dreyfuss, supra note 88, at 906-09. Biotechnology products must be deposited, to compensate
for the fact that written specifications do not adequately reveal the ideas in the inventions. The
deposit system is vulnerable to misuse, however; access to study the organism also provides the
opportunity to acquire it by allowing it to reproduce. See Ellen J. Flannery & Peter B. Hutt,
Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 269 (1985).
268. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1988); see Dreyfuss supra note 88, at 910; see
also Susan Kopp Keyack, Note, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984: Is It a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 147 (1989).
269. Ashford et. al, supra note 189; Ashford & Heaton, Jr., supra note 189. Removing uncertainty
in government policy would stimulate innovation. CHIUSTOPHER FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 167-68 (1982). But see BURTON H. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977) (uncertainty is good).
270. This proposal has been made elsewhere. See Atkinson & Sherman, supra note 265, at 169
n.30.
271. MORTON KAMIEN & NANCY SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION (1983). This
may only work in large industries, with environmental problems which are structured to support
an incentive.
272. Entry and other antitrust concerns could be integrated into the rule structure. For a discussion
of ongoing activity in analysis of intersection of innovation and antitrust concerns, see Douglas
Ginsburg, Antitrust, Uncertainty and Technological Innovation, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 635 (1979).
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust: Striking the Right
Balance, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1989) (suggesting greater use of commercial alliance arrangements
to encourage innovation).
273. See Atkinson & Sherman, supra note 265.

Winter 19931

SECRECY AND INNOVATION IN TORT LAW

Using patent law as an instrument to achieve goals which are usually
categorized as "environmental" may seem to be a departure from intellectual property law's familiar task of encouraging the development
of technology. Atkinson and Sherman have noted that one underlying
ethic of intellectual property law is a laissez-faire neutrality as to types
of invention to be encouraged. They suggest that this tendency has
increased in strength in the latter part of the twentieth century, exacerbating the isolation of intellectual property law from other parts of
the law, whereas the opposite has occurred in other areas, where theorists
have pursued integration. 2 4 The true concern of intellectual property law
is clearly not to produce technology without any qualitative constraints,
and a mild constraint would be to require that it encourage efficient
technology. Efficient innovation in this sense can be narrowly defined
to include minimizing damaging externalities. More expansively, efficient
technology would progress along flexible and sustainable channels of
development.
V.

CONCLUSION

The myth of Pandora's box, in Sisella Bok's words, "unfolds interweaving layers of secrecy and revelation. [It] is one of the many tales
of calamities befalling those who uncover what is concealed and thereby
release dangerous forces that should have been left in darkness and
silence.

' 27

At the same time, Bok notes that it is Oedipus' revelation

276
of the Sphinx's riddle which ends the reign of terror over Thebes.
These stories express the link between knowledge, power, and freedom.
Because secrets appear both unstable and powerful, we start from a
common ambivalence about confronting them. 277 Perhaps it is better to
leave them alone. Yet we know from experience that if we carefully
explore the boundaries of a secret, we may find that it is not as complex
or impressive as it had seemed.
The protection that the common law gives to commercially valuable
secrets cannot be extended to health and environmental information
without ignoring the basic principles of trade secret law, such as notice
and .duty, and those of the related areas of warning, consent, and privacy.
The only way to grant such protection is simply to declare trade secrets
"property," but this is not supported by economic analysis or by any
of the standard approaches to entitlements. Learning about pollution is
a social project, and blocking its progress cannot credibly be made into
a private privilege. Trade secrecy doctrines, therefore, should not be
applied to health and environmental information.

274. Id. at 170; see also discussion supra of development of information entitlements related to
chemical industry.
275. BOK, supra note 2, at 4.
276. Id.at 5.
277. Id.

